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ABSTRACT
President Trump’s currently litigated “transgender ban,” which
excludes transgender persons from military service, is premised
in part upon a claim that transgender persons’ presence in the
military adversely affects “unit cohesion.” This use of identitybased “unit cohesion” as a justification for excluding a group
from military service is the latest episode in a long history of the
government asserting “unit cohesion” to justify excluding people
from military service based on their identities. This Article contends that unit cohesion, when premised on identity, is always an
impermissible justification for exclusion from military service because it is unconstitutional animus. Though the animus doctrine
is incomplete, with only a few Supreme Court cases identifying
its contours, its growing significance to equal protection jurisprudence should not be ignored. This Article demonstrates that unit
cohesion is animus under each of the variants articulated by the
Supreme Court and understood by animus scholars. Though this
Article argues that all attempts to justify exclusion from military
service using identity-based claims of unit cohesion are impermissible animus, it applies animus jurisprudence only to the current
“transgender ban.” By applying animus jurisprudence to the
transgender ban, this Article demonstrates that this latest use of
unit cohesion should invalidate the ban.
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INTRODUCTION
The military has asserted “unit cohesion”1 to exclude from military service a variety of groups, including African-Americans;2
women;3 homosexual individuals;4 and, most recently, people with
non-cis-gendered gender identities.5 The argument that the presence of certain people will, because of their identity, cause military
units to lack the cohesion necessary for military effectiveness is unconstitutional, invidious discrimination.
1. “Unit cohesion” generally refers to a military group’s mutual reinforcement of positive behaviors and attitudes toward group membership and commitment to a common goal. For a thorough discussion of research and current
understandings of military unit cohesion, see THOMAS S. SZAYNA ET AL., CONSIDERATIONS FOR INTEGRATING WOMEN INTO CLOSED OCCUPATIONS IN U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES 55–76 (2016). Numerous studies of unit cohesion have
culminated in the modern understanding of unit cohesion having two dimensions:
task cohesion and social cohesion. Task cohesion is “the extent to which unit
members share a common goal and coordinate their efforts to achieve it.” Id. at
59. Social cohesion includes three elements: “unit members’ interpersonal attraction, shared bonds of trust, and provision of social support.” Id. at 65.
2. See, e.g., Alexander B. Downes, Would Transgender Troops Harm Military
Effectiveness? Here’s What the Research Says, WASH. POST (Mar. 27, 2018), https://
wapo.st/2LwtXHE (noting Army Chief of Staff Gen. George Marshall defended
segregation in the military in 1940 by claiming, “to intermingle white and colored
personnel in the same regimental organization . . . would inevitably have a highly
destructive effect on morale—meaning military efficiency.”).
3. As recently as 1980, a Senate Committee on Armed Services report rejected women registering for the draft for a variety of reasons, including that their
presence would “impair the male bonding and unit cohesion necessary for military
effectiveness.” Valorie K. Vojdik, Beyond Stereotyping in Equal Protection Doctrine: Reframing the Exclusion of Women from Combat, 57 ALA. L. REV. 303, 326
(2005) (citing LINDA BIRD FRANCKE, GROUND ZERO: THE GENDER WARS IN THE
MILITARY 157 (1997)).
4. The so-called “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” law was premised in part on unit
cohesion. See 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(14) (2006) (repealed 2010) (“The armed forces
must maintain personnel policies that exclude persons whose presence in the
armed forces would create an unacceptable risk to the armed forces’ high standards of morale, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion that are the essence
of military capability.”) (emphasis added). Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’s predecessor,
which banned service by homosexual persons, was similarly supported in part by
unit cohesion justifications. See, e.g., Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 811 (9th
Cir. 1980) (“The Navy is concerned about tensions between known homosexuals
and other members who ‘despise/detest homosexuality.’ ”).
5. See, e.g., Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 26, 2017,
5:55 AM), http://bit.ly/2xljsxT; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER
(July 26, 2017, 6:04 AM), http://bit.ly/2MC9LR6; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 26, 2017, 6:08 AM), http://bit.ly/2QuNKqG [hereinafter
“July 26, 2017 Twitter Announcement”] (barring transgender persons from serving
in the military).
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This Article accepts that military unit cohesion, long understood as essential for effective military action, is a compelling government interest.6 Additionally, this Article does not evaluate
factual claims regarding whether the presence of a specific excluded
group actually affects unit cohesion or whether impaired unit cohesion actually affects mission accomplishment.7 Rather, this Article
demonstrates that identity-based unit cohesion is always an unconstitutional basis for exclusion from military service because it constitutes impermissible animus. In other words, excluding persons
from military service because their mere presence—based on who
they are, rather than what they can do8—will adversely affect unit
cohesion is nothing more than government institutionalization of
private biases and prejudices, a practice prohibited by the Supreme
Court’s animus jurisprudence.
When the government claims “unit cohesion,” it justifies identity-based exclusions from military service using the perceived adverse effect of a group’s presence on unit cohesion. However, when
the government puts forth this justification, it essentially accepts
that the social discomfort, dislike, or disapproval of certain military
unit members will lead to ineffectiveness. In the military context,
these private prejudices have been launched against the inclusion of
African-Americans, Asian-Americans, women, homosexual individuals, and now transgender persons.9 In all of these cases, the
adverse effect on unit cohesion was premised on the idea that individuals within the military unit harbored some view of the excluded
6. See, e.g., SZAYNA, ET AL., supra note 1, at 55; Robert J. MacCoun & William M. Hix, Unit Cohesion and Military Performance, in SEXUAL ORIENTATION
AND U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL POLICY 137, 137–158 (2010). This article likewise
does not address which forms of cohesion—especially task cohesion and social cohesion—actually result in military effectiveness. Because this article focuses on
unit cohesion based on identity rather than capacity, it necessarily relates most to
social cohesion rather than task cohesion. However, it does so without entering
the debate regarding the relative importance of those types of cohesion. See, e.g.,
MacCoun & Hix, supra note 6, at 139 (describing social and task cohesion); see
generally Robert J. MacCoun et al., Does Social Cohesion Determine Motivation in
Combat? An Old Question with an Old Answer, 32 ARMED FORCES & SOC. 646
(2006) (arguing social cohesion does not impact unit performance and suggesting a
contrary finding in a paper by the Army War College ignored critical evidence).
7. See, e.g., SZAYNA ET AL., supra note 1, at 60, 70 (noting evidence that cohesion affects unit performance is mixed).
8. I do not argue that all claims of unit cohesion are invalid, as claims of unit
cohesion based on members’ abilities to contribute to the mission, attitude, or performance may be non-invidious discrimination and militarily necessary. For example, combat units may exclude persons who lack sufficient physical aptitude to
perform missions requiring uncommon physical abilities without violating the Constitution’s prohibition on inequality based on arbitrary or irrational classification.
9. See supra notes 3–6 and accompanying text.
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group that restricted their abilities to work together effectively in
the military environment.10 These views are animus, and government classifications based on animus are unconstitutional.
Numerous plaintiffs filed lawsuits challenging the United
States’ ban on transgender persons serving in the military.11 In response, the government defended its so-called “transgender ban”
on three bases: (1) “[a]t least some transgender individuals suffer
from medical conditions that could impede the performance of
their duties;”12 (2) certain medical conditions “may limit the
deployability of transgender individuals as well as impose additional costs on the armed forces;”13 and (3) the presence of transgender individuals in the military would harm “unit cohesion.”14
This Article focuses on the last justification.
The animus doctrine has quietly taken center stage in the Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence. Indeed, in the last
few decades the Court has used animus to find a variety of government actions unconstitutional, including discrimination against
“hippies,”15 the cognitively impaired,16 gays and lesbians,17 and ra10. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(14) (2006) (repealed 2010) (“The armed
forces must maintain personnel policies that exclude [homosexual] persons whose
presence in the armed forces would create an unacceptable risk to the armed
forces’ high standards of morale, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion that
are the essence of military capability.”); Beth J. Asch & Paul Heaton, Recruiting
and Retention, in SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL POLICY
167, 171–72 (2010) (quoting a letter written by Admiral Adolphus Andrews that
said the Navy limited black sailors to stewards because if afforded greater rank and
responsibilities, “team work, harmony, and ship efficiency [would be] seriously
handicapped”); SZAYNA ET AL., supra note 1, at 78 (noting 85 percent of special
forces survey participants opposed letting women into their specialties, with 80–83
percent expecting a decline in cohesion); Rowan Scarborough, Lawmaker Moves
to Bar Women from Subs: Wants Congress to Decide Matter, WASH. TIMES, May 5,
2000, at A1; Anna Simons, Here’s Why Women in Combat Units Is a Bad Idea,
WAR ON ROCKS (Nov. 18, 2014), http://bit.ly/2D13NK6 (arguing unit cohesion
would be adversely harmed because heterosexual men would compete for
women’s attention); see generally BRIAN MITCHELL, WEAK LINK: THE FEMINIZATION OF THE AMERICAN MILITARY (1989) (arguing that the presence of women in
the military is harmful to cohesion and effectiveness);
11. See, e.g., Doe v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 167, 211 (D.D.C. 2017); Karnoski
v. Trump, No. C17-1297-MJP, 2017 WL 6311305, at *7 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 11, 2017).
See infra Part III for a thorough discussion of the transgender ban.
12. Doe, 275 F. Supp. 3d at 212; Karnoski, 2017 WL 6311305, at *8.
13. Doe, 275 F. Supp. 3d at 211.
14. Id. at 212; Karnoski, 2017 WL 6311305, at *7.
15. See U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (“[I]f the
constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it must
at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate government interest.”).
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cial minorities.18 These animus cases each arose under circumstances where the Court could have applied its traditional tiers-ofscrutiny analysis based on suspect or quasi-suspect classifications19
but instead cited animus as the basis for striking down unconstitutional discrimination. Moreover, these animus cases were decided
during a period in which the Supreme Court failed to identify new
suspect or quasi-suspect classifications.20
Scholars have recognized this “rise of animus.”21 Some have
applauded this new equal protection doctrine and have attempted
to comprehensively explain the Court’s varied animus decisions.22
16. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446–47 (1985)
(“[S]ome objectives—such as ‘a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular
group’—are not legitimate state interests.” (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534)).
17. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 770 (2013) (“The Constitution’s
guarantee of equality ‘must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire
to harm a politically unpopular group cannot justify disparate treatment of that
group.” (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534–35)); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,
634–35 (1996) (finding an amendment to a state constitution that barred gays and
lesbians from any particular protections from the law violated the Equal Protection Clause because, in part, it was born out of “animosity toward the class of
persons affected”).
18. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (“Private biases may be
outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them
effect.”).
19. Under the Supreme Court’s traditional approach, to assess an equal protection claim, a court determines whether the classification at issue is “suspect” or
“quasi-suspect.” See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (finding
that racial classifications are suspect classifications); Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456,
461 (1988) (developing the idea of quasi-suspect classifications). If the classification is suspect, the court applies strict scrutiny, which requires that the government’s interest is compelling and the classification is narrowly tailored to
accomplish the interest. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326. If the classification is quasi-suspect, the court applies intermediate scrutiny, which requires that the government’s
interest is important and that the classification substantially relates to accomplishing that interest. Clark, 486 U.S. at 461. If the classification is neither suspect nor
quasi-suspect, the court applies only rational basis review, under which the government must be attempting to accomplish a legitimate interest and classifying in a
way that is rationally related to accomplishing that interest. See, e.g., City of New
Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (applying rational basis review to economic regulation).
20. See, e.g., Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV.
747, 757 (2011) (“At least with respect to federal equal protection jurisprudence,
th[e] canon [of suspect class analysis] has closed.”).
21. See, e.g., William D. Araiza, Animus and Its Discontents 1 (unpublished
manuscript), http://bit.ly/2pcF23V (last visited Aug. 30, 2018) (noting the concept
of animus in equal protection law and observing that the concept has been responsible for a string of equal protection victories for gay and lesbian advocates).
22. See, e.g., id.; Dale Carpenter, Windsor Products: Equal Protection from
Animus, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 183 (2013); Susannah W. Pollvogt, Unconstitutional
Animus, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 887 (2012).
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Others have sounded alarms and have critiqued the role that animus has come to play in the Court’s jurisprudence.23
Lower federal courts have also begun using animus to decide
cases, even beyond the equal protection context. For instance, the
early “travel ban” cases were decided, in part, on the notion that
animus toward a particular religion violated the First Amendment.24 But the irregularity with which federal courts have applied
the Court’s animus jurisprudence suggests that some courts have
missed the jurisprudential shift: the Court appears to have abandoned the rigid tiers-of-scrutiny approach for a new method of discerning equal protection violations.
Lower federal courts are not soley to blame for missing the
Supreme Court’s equal protection shift. First, though the Court has
broken no new ground in its traditional tiers-of-scrutiny approach,
it still routinely employs that approach’s terminology to decide
challenges to suspect and quasi-suspect classifications. More significantly, while the Court has identified various forms of animus,25 it
has failed to articulate a unified understanding of the doctrine and
its significance. Indeed, though the animus canon has developed
over several decades, scholars have only recently begun attempting
comprehensive explanations.
Part I of this Article discusses each of the “forms of animus”
that the Court has recognized and explains how each form interacts
with the justification of unit cohesion. In addition to case precedent, this Article applies several scholarly explanations of the animus doctrine to the unit cohesion justification and concludes that
identity-based unit cohesion is animus in all of its conceptions.
Part II discusses various theories regarding the effect of a finding of animus and applies those theories to unit cohesion claims.
23. See generally Brief of Amici Curiae Stephen G. Calabresi, Daniel O. Conkle, Michael J. Perry, and Brett G. Scharffs in Support of Certiorari and Opposing
a Rule Based on Voters’ Motivations, Herbert v. Kitchen, 135 S. Ct. 265 (2014)
(No. 14-124) (arguing the Court should reject animus as a reason to strike down
same-sex marriage bans); Steven D. Smith, The Jurisprudence of Denigration, 48
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 675 (2014) (arguing that Windor exemplifies the Supreme
Court’s contribution to the so-called “culture wars”); see also Dan Conkle, Evolving Values, Animus, and Same-Sex Marriage, 89 IND. L.J. 27, 40 (2014).
24. See, e.g., Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 595–601
(4th Cir. 2017); see also Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2421 (2018). In Trump v.
Hawaii, the Court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the travel ban constituted
religious animus in violation of First Amendment because the travel ban was “inexplicable by anything but animus.” Id. The Court’s animus discussion was not
full-throated and occurred in the First Amendment context, rather than in light of
the Equal Protection Clause. See id. at 2420–23.
25. See infra Part I for a discussion of the various forms of animus.
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The government rarely justifies a classification solely on bases that
suggest animus. Thus, whether a finding of animus in one of the
government’s proffered justifications invalidates the others is critical to our understanding of the impact of the animus doctrine on
equal protection claims.
Part III addresses the transgender ban and its subsequent litigation. Part III demonstrates how unit cohesion is an unconstitutional justification. Further, Part III notes the surprising paucity of
animus discussions in the transgender ban opinions produced thus
far.
Although this Article uses the transgender ban as an example
in its discussion of unit cohesion claims, the scope of this Article is
not limited to the unconstitutionality of the transgender ban.
Rather, this Article demonstrates the unconstitutionality of all
identity-based unit cohesion claims that are premised on the disruptive effect of certain persons in the military.
I. UNIT COHESION

AND THE

SEVERAL FORMS

OF

ANIMUS

The Supreme Court’s animus jurisprudence is incomplete. The
Court’s animus cases, though not contradictory, illuminate different
facets of what animus is, how it is identified, and what effect a finding of animus has on a government action. Scholarly catalogues of
the cases that comprise the animus “canon” vary, but most identify
some version of a “quadrilogy” of cases, while others identify
more.26 This section groups the animus cases in the following manner: animus based on private stereotype and prejudice;27 animus
demonstrated by legislative desire to harm;28 animus demonstrated
by structure;29 and dignitary injury as impermissible animus.30
While scholars continue to debate the significance of the Supreme Court’s animus cases, some have begun attempting to articulate a coherent animus doctrine—something the Court has yet to
do. As this Article demonstrates, unit cohesion as a justification for
excluding people from military service based on their identities is
animus in all of its forms.31 That is, unit cohesion is animus under
26. Compare Carpenter, supra note 22, at 183 (referring to the group of primary animus cases as a “quadrilogy”), with Pollvogt, supra note 22, at 898–900
(identifying at least seven animus cases).
27. See infra Part I.A.
28. See infra Part I.B.
29. See infra Part I.C.
30. See infra Part I.D.
31. See infra Parts I.A.3, I.B.2, I.C.2, I.D.2.
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each of its conceptions set forth by the Supreme Court and articulated by leading animus scholars.
A. Animus Based on Private Stereotype and Prejudice: Palmore
and Cleburne
1. The Palmore Approach to Animus
Two early animus cases—Palmore v. Sidoti32 and City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center33—focus on the type of animus
that most directly relates to the root of the “unit cohesion” justification: where the government adopts or gives effect to private bias or
prejudice.
In Palmore, the Supreme Court unanimously held that a family
court judge’s order, which awarded sole custody of a child to the
child’s father because the mother was in an interracial marriage,
violated the Equal Protection Clause.34 The family court’s decision
was purportedly based not on the judge’s own racial prejudice or
intolerance of miscegenation, but rather on a concern that the
mother’s marriage would subject the child to social stigmatization
resulting from society’s disapproval of multi-race marriages.35 In
other words, the animus underlying the government action belonged to society, not the government actor.
Palmore is not always presented in discussions of the animus
canon.36 This omission is not without reason. First, the word animus does not appear in the Court’s opinion. Second, the classification at issue was based on race, so one might observe that the
traditional strict scrutiny test underlie the Court’s analysis. Indeed,
the Court appeared to apply heightened scrutiny, noting that the
state’s interest in granting custody based on the best interests of the
child was “indisputably a substantial governmental interest for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause.”37 Further, it would have
been difficult to argue that when racial prejudice obstructs the government’s interest, the government’s reliance on race to solve the
problem was not narrowly tailored.38 Thus, the Court could have
32. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
33. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
34. Palmore, 466 U.S. at 433–34.
35. Id. at 431–32.
36. Compare Carpenter, supra note 22, at 204 (identifying only Windsor,
Romer, Cleburne, and Moreno as animus cases), with Pollvogt, supra note 22, at
906–10 (identifying the animus analysis in Palmore as its own form of animus).
37. Palmore, 466 U.S. at 433.
38. See Pollvogt, supra note 22, at 907 (suggesting that the use of race under
the circumstances was “perfectly tailored”).
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easily decided Palmore by applying traditional strict scrutiny. But it
did not.
Palmore’s importance to the animus cannon emerges from the
Court’s unanimous conclusion that the family court’s order was unconstitutional, even though the judge’s decision survived strict scrutiny. The Supreme Court held the judge’s decision unconstitutional
because “[p]rivate biases may be outside the reach of the law, but
the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.”39 The Palmore Court did not attempt to ascertain whether the underlying private bias was reasonable or even whether it existed at all, but it
instead found fault in the fact that the judge’s order gave effect to
private bias. The Court thus mandated that public laws not express
or enforce private bias. In fact, the Court opined, “the reality of
private biases and the possible injury they might inflict” are impermissible considerations.40
The Court in Palmore also alluded to another instance of private bias that is relevant to the military’s unit cohesion justification.
The Palmore Court referenced its earlier decision in Buchanan v.
Warley,41 which invalidated a Kentucky law that forbade black persons from buying homes in white neighborhoods. The law had been
premised on promoting the public peace by preventing race conflicts.42 Quoting from its decision in Warley, the Palmore Court
noted: “Desirable as [preventing race conflicts] is, and important as
is the preservation of the public peace, this aim cannot be accomplished by laws or ordinances which deny rights created or protected by the Federal Constitution.”43 The Palmore Court cited
additional cases that held the community’s reaction to the presence
of certain individuals could not justify excluding those individuals.
The Court quoted from its earlier opinion in Wright v. Georgia,44
which held “the possibility of disorder by others cannot justify exclusion of persons from a place if they otherwise have a constitutional right (founded upon the Equal Protection Clause) to be
present.”45 These cases demonstrate that the Supreme Court has
repeatedly and consistently found government enforcement of private prejudice impermissible, even when the justifications are legitimate or even compelling.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Palmore, 466 U.S. at 433.
Id.
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
Palmore, 466 U.S. at 433–34 (citing Buchanan, 245 U.S. at 81).
Id. at 434 (quoting Buchanan, 245 U.S. at 81).
Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284 (1963).
Palmore, 466 U.S. at 434 n.3 (quoting Wright, 373 U.S. at 293).
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2. The Cleburne Approach to Animus
The Court’s decision in Cleburne further clarified the significance of Palmore to the animus doctrine and advanced the Court’s
animus jurisprudence in two significant ways. First, Cleburne may
have marked the end of the Court’s use of suspect classification
analysis and the traditional tiers-of-scrutiny approach. Since
Cleburne, the Court has identified no new suspect or quasi-suspect
classifications; in fact, the Court’s subsequent equal protection decisions use only the classifications and levels of scrutiny that were in
place at the time of Cleburne. Second, Cleburne’s reliance on Palmore advanced the idea that a government actor violates the Equal
Protection Clause when its actions are based on private bias.
Cleburne clarified that such private bias constitutes animus. And if
a government actor bases a decision on animus, it violates the
Equal Protection Clause.
In Cleburne, the Supreme Court held that the Cleburne City
Council violated the Equal Protection Clause when it denied the
Cleburne Living Center’s (CLC) request for a special use permit.
CLC planned to build a group home for mentally disabled persons,
but a city zoning regulation required CLC to first obtain a special
use permit. The city required special use permits for certain types
of homes, including “[h]ospitals for the insane or feeble-minded.”46
When the Cleburne City Council declined CLC’s request for a permit, CLC sued alleging the denial violated the Equal Protection
Clause.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that
cognitive disability qualified as a quasi-suspect classification. Despite several factors weighing in favor of such a determination—
including the immutability of cognitive disability and the relative
political powerlessness of the class—the Supreme Court overruled
the Fifth Circuit’s decision.47 The Court found that because mental
disability could be relevant to public legislation, classification on
that basis was not inherently suspect.48 Because it found that cognitive disability did not qualify as a suspect classification, the Court
applied rational basis review.49
Contrary to the expected result of rational basis review, the
Court struck down the City Council’s denial of the permit, finding
animus underlay the City Council’s decision. Specifically, the Court
46.
(1985).
47.
48.
49.

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 436–37
Id. at 442–47.
Id.
Id.
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determined that the City Council’s decision rested on “irrational
prejudice against the mentally [disabled].”50 Importantly, the Court
determined it immaterial whether the irrational prejudice belonged
to the individual City Council members or the City Council as an
institution or whether the decision merely manifested the City
Council’s acquiescence to city residents’ stereotypes and fears of
the intellectually disabled.51 The Court noted that “the electorate
as a whole, whether by referendum or otherwise, could not order
city action violative of the Equal Protection Clause . . . and the city
may not avoid the strictures of that Clause by deferring to the
wishes or objections of some fraction of the body politic.”52
In Cleburne, the legislative history of the City Council’s decision provided explicit evidence of community members’ ill will.
Community members publicly expressed negative attitudes toward
persons with intellectual disabilities. Perhaps more charitably,
some community members expressed concerns that others—nearby
high school students, for example—might harass mentally disabled
persons based on their irrational prejudices.53
As it had in Palmore, the Court held the City of Cleburne’s
reliance on private prejudices and biases unconstitutional.
Cleburne extended Palmore’s exhortation that “[p]rivate biases
may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or
indirectly, give them effect.”54 Where Palmore prohibited government action that relied on private biases about race, which was already a suspect classification, Cleburne prohibited government
action that relied on private biases about cognitive ability.55 In so
doing, Cleburne expanded the prohibition on government adoption
of private bias against suspect classifications to all private biases.
3. Palmore, Cleburne, and the Unit Cohesion Justification
Palmore and Cleburne stand for the principle that impermissible animus exists when irrational private biases motivate govern50. Id. at 450.
51. This distinguished Cleburne from Moreno, which was based on the legislators’ animus against “hippies.” See U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528,
534 (1973). For an elaboration of the distinction between Cleburne and Moreno,
see infra notes 68–72 and accompanying text.
52. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448 (citation omitted).
53. Id. at 449.
54. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 329, 433 (1984).
55. In fact, the Palmore Court noted that the case raised “important federal
concerns arising from the Constitution’s commitments to eradicating discrimination based on race.” Id. The Court elaborated, “A core purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment was to do away with all governmentally imposed discrimination based
on race.” Id. at 432 (emphasis added).
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ment action. Viewed in light of this principle, Cleburne’s
devastating effect on claims of identity-based unit cohesion becomes clear. When the government claims that the presence of a
particular group in the military would disrupt unit cohesion, it is not
claiming that the military as an institution is incapable of accepting
those persons. Rather, the government is claiming that individual
military members have prejudices based on stereotypes—whether
dislike, discomfort, disapproval, or moral approbation—that adversely affect their abilities to work closely with persons from the
excluded group. The individual military members comprise the military’s “society”; therefore, claims of unit cohesion rest entirely on
the attitudes—the private biases and prejudices—of the military society. As opposed to other purported deleterious effects of the
presence of a particular group in the military, the only way that the
presence of a particular type of person or persons could disrupt unit
cohesion is through the views of individual unit members. The
Cleburne Court clearly mandated that such private biases are impermissible considerations for classifications when it declared:
“[T]he [government] may not avoid the strictures of [the Equal Protection Clause] by deferring to the wishes or objections of some
fraction of the body politic.”56
Moreover, Palmore’s allusion to earlier decisions that invalidated laws that excluded people based on the anticipated adverse
reactions of community members57 incorporated into modern equal
protection jurisprudence the notion that no matter how disruptive
someone’s presence may be, the reaction of others—or even the
disorder caused by including unpopular persons—cannot form the
basis for exclusion. Claims of identity-based unit cohesion are
founded on this forbidden basis. The claim of “unit cohesion”
maintains that members of society (the “unit”) will react in a manner that causes disorder (or lack of “cohesion”) if certain individuals occupy the community (the unit). The Court has repeatedly
prohibited unequal treatment based on a community’s reaction,
even when the government’s interest is undeniably compelling, such
56. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448; see also Palmore, 466 U.S. at 433 (“Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly,
give them effect.”).
57. The Palmore Court cited to Buchanan v. Warley, which invalidated a prohibition of black residents purchasing homes in white neighborhoods that was premised on the possibility that integration would cause a disruption of peace.
Palmore, 466 U.S. at 433–34 (citing Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 81 (1917)).
The Palmore Court also quoted Wright v. Georgia, in which the Court concluded
that “the possibility of disorder by others cannot justify exclusion of persons from
a place if they otherwise have a constitutional right . . . to be present.” Id. at 434
n.3 (quoting Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284, 293 (1963)).
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as when the government attempts to ensure the best interest of a
child,58 prevent violence and turmoil in public places,59 preserve the
safety and tranquility of residential areas,60 or avoid disorder.61 In
other words, the compelling government interest of “unit cohesion”
cannot save the government’s unconstitutional enforcement of private bias.
B. Animus Demonstrated by Legislative Desire to Harm: Moreno
1. The Moreno Approach to Animus
The first modern equal protection case in the Court’s animus
canon was U.S. Department of Agriculture v. Moreno.62 In 1971,
Congress amended the Food Stamp Act to disqualify households
with two or more unrelated individuals from receiving food stamp
benefits.63 The amendment thus distinguished between persons
who lived only with relatives from those who lived in households
with one or more unrelated occupants.64 In addressing an equal
protection challenge to this classification, the Supreme Court applied rational basis review and determined that the amendment had
no rational connection to the overall purposes of the food stamp
program.65 The Court cited the amendment’s legislative history
and specifically focused on several legislators’ comments about
“hippies” and “hippie communes.”66 The Court then set forth the
foundational articulation of modern equal protection animus jurisprudence: “[I]f the constitutional conception of ‘equal protection
of the laws’ means anything, it must at the very least mean that a
bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group
cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.”67
58. Id. at 433 (“The goal of granting custody based on the best interests of the
child is indisputably a substantial governmental interest for purposes of the Equal
Protection Clause.”).
59. Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 535–36 (1963).
60. See Buchanan, 245 U.S. at 81 (“[I]mportant as is the preservation of the
public peace, this aim cannot be accomplished by laws or ordinances which deny
rights created or protected by the Federal Constitution.”).
61. See Wright, 373 U.S. at 293 (“[T]he possibility of disorder by others cannot justify exclusion of persons from a place if they otherwise have a constitutional
right . . . to be present.”).
62. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
63. Id. at 529.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 538.
66. Id. at 534 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 91-1793, at 8 (1970) (Conf. Rep.) (statement of Sen. Spessard Holland)).
67. Id.
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The government actors’ personal desires to cause harm in
Moreno is distinct from the government’s reliance on private bias in
Palmore and Cleburne. Yet the primary difference between the two
sets of cases is not whose prejudice is at the root of the discrimination, but rather the intent behind the classification. In Palmore, racial prejudice underlay the impermissible classification, but no
evidence showing the judge intended to cause race-based harm existed.68 Similarly, in Cleburne, the stereotypes upon which the City
Council based its impermissible decision did not produce an affirmative desire to harm people with cognitive disabilities; rather, the
stereotypes produced a not-in-my-backyard desire to avoid the theoretical consequences of permitting a group home in the center of
the city.69 By contrast, the goal of the legislation in Moreno was to
harm a specific group.70 The Court did not explore why the government wanted to cause harm. Instead, the Court focused only on the
government’s attempt to harm and found that discrimination for
the sake of discrimination is impermissible.71
2. Moreno and the Unit Cohesion Justification
If Moreno is interpreted to prohibit a form of animus where
there is affirmative intent to harm the adversely affected class, it
may be the most difficult to associate with unit cohesion claims.
Though a government actor’s language or actions could demonstrate an affirmative desire to harm a group by excluding it from
military service, a reasonably circumspect government actor would
likely not offer such direct evidence as the pejorative language that
the legislators used in Moreno.72
At its core, a unit cohesion claim is an assertion that military
members dislike certain persons and is thus based on private
prejudice or fear, as were the actions Palmore and Cleburne. But
unit cohesion claims could also serve as pretext for a government
actor’s desire to harm the excluded group.
At a minimum, assertions that a unit lacks cohesion based on
the identity of a particular person or group are premised on the
68. Recall that the judge’s intent was to benefit a child by not subjecting her
to societal disdain attached to mixed-race parents. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S.
429, 433 (1984).
69. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448–50
(1985).
70. See Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534–35.
71. Id.
72. The Court found a “desire to harm” in the legislative history where it
demonstrated that the amendment was intended to prevent “hippies” and “hippie
communes” from participating in the food stamp program. Id. at 534.
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idea that individuals belonging to the excluded group make current
military members feel uncomfortable. And because those members
feel uncomfortable, they cannot work with individuals who belong
to the excluded group. But excluding people on this basis is nothing more than exclusion for exclusion’s sake, or discrimination for
discrimination’s sake. Military members’ dislike of a particular
group could ostensibly motivate some political actors to “harm”
that group. These political actors might harm the disliked group to
curry favor with the electorate. When government actors exclude a
particular group to please the majority, they act in direct contravention of Moreno. Thus, the “political unpopularity” of the excluded
group can comprise both the reason why members of the excluded
group disrupt unit cohesion and the government actor’s animusbased motivation to harm it.
C. Animus Demonstrated by Structure: Romer
1. The Romer Approach to Animus
In Romer v. Evans,73 the Court assessed an equal protection
challenge to Colorado’s Amendment 2, an amendment to the Colorado Constitution that eliminated antidiscrimination protections for
homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual conduct, orientation, practices, or
relationships at any level of state government.74 Opponents of
Amendment 2 deemed it a hate-motivated revision to Colorado
law.75
Compared to Moreno, where direct evidence of lawmaker animus existed,76 or Cleburne and Palmore, where lawmakers responded to private animus,77 the animus in Romer was more
elusive. The elusive nature of the animus behind Amendment 2
stemmed in part from the manner in which it was adopted: statewide ballot referendum.78 In essence, all of Colorado’s citizens who
voted for Amendment 2 were its “lawmakers.” As such, the legislative intent behind the amendment could not be gleaned from a simple review of the legislative history. Romer thus illustrates the
difficulty of determining the government’s intent, especially when
73. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
74. Id. at 623–25.
75. Id. at 625; Julie Turkewitz, Colorado, Once Called the ‘Hate State,’ Grapples with Cake Baker Decision, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 2018), https://nyti.ms/
2xMBv3n (noting Colorado was labeled the “Hate State” in response to Colorado’s adoption of Amendment 2).
76. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
77. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985);
Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984).
78. Romer, 517 U.S. at 623.
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the “government” encompassed millions of minds.79 Perhaps anticipating an animus challenge, Amendment 2 proponents argued that
a dislike of gays and lesbians did not motivate their support for the
amendment; rather, their support for the amendment stemmed
from a neutral desire to prohibit those groups from possessing “special rights.”80 Thus, the proponents argued, Amendment 2 did not
discriminate against a particular group but instead attempted to
protect the associational rights of people who disapproved of homosexuality.81 In other words, proponents claimed that Amendment 2 protected the rights of many. If Amendment 2 was really
founded upon libertarian ideals, then, arguably, no animus existed
because it was motivated by a desire to protect associational rights.
One element of unit cohesion claims parallels the libertarian ideals
advanced by the proponents of Amendment 2: the government
should not force a person to associate with something or someone
that he or she dislikes.
In Romer, the Supreme Court found direct evidence that animus had motivated 53 percent of the Colorado voters who voted in
favor of Amendment 2. But the Court’s decision was not dictated
by this finding. Indeed, the Court ignored strong evidence of animus, such as a significant record of anti-gay bias among Amendment 2’s proponents.82 The Court ignored this evidence, in part,
because it could not invalidate Amendment 2 simply based on
Amendment 2’s treatment of homosexual persons. When the Court
decided Romer, Bowers v. Hardwick,83 which permitted state
criminalization of sodomy,84 was still good law. Because it had upheld anti-gay legislation based on moral disapproval in Bowers,85
the Court was at pains to strike down anti-gay legislation in Romer
solely based on societal disapproval of homosexual orientation.
Because the Supreme Court could not deem Colorado voters’
moral disapproval unlawful discrimination, it turned to the structure of the law—in particular, the law’s unusual breadth and narrowness. The Court held that by withdrawing civil rights
79. See id.; see generally Michael D. Gilbert, Interpreting Initiatives, 97 MINN.
L. REV. 1621 (2013) (arguing that courts should interpret initiatives based on the
intent of the median voter).
80. Romer, 517 U.S. at 626.
81. Id. at 635.
82. See Cara DeGette, Inside the Belly of the Beast, in RESISTING THE RAINBOW: RIGHT-WING RESPONSES TO LGBT GAINS, POLITICAL RESEARCH ASSOCIATES 29 (2012), http://bit.ly/2QAxQuR.
83. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
84. Id. at 196.
85. Id.
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protections from only one narrowly defined group and by “imposing a broad and undifferentiated disability” upon that group,
Amendment 2 was both “too narrow and too broad,”86 and thus,
“inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects.”87
Focusing on the unusual impact of the law, the Court noted that
Amendment 2 did not discriminate against homosexual persons in
only one particular way.88 Instead, by removing all non-discrimination protections based on sexual orientation, Amendment 2’s discrimination encompassed a wide array of the aspects of everyday
life.89 The Court also noted the unusual precision with which
Amendment 2 discriminated against homosexual persons: Amendment 2 identified “persons by a single trait and then den[ied] them
protection across the board.”90 Amendment 2 especially troubled
the Court because it withdrew “from homosexuals, but no others,
specific legal protection from the injuries caused by discrimination.”91 Looking for a sufficient justification for Amendment 2’s
breadth and laser-like focus on homosexual persons, the Court
could find only one: animus.92
2. Romer and the Unit Cohesion Justification
Unit cohesion justifications resemble the animus methodology
in Romer in an important way. As with the justifications for
Amendment 2 in Romer, unit cohesion justifications often constitute across-the-board discrimination that is at once too narrow and
too broad; that is, there is a lack of fit between the discrimination
and its purpose. If Romer animus is the idea that overly broad injuries to a single, narrow class “raise the inevitable inference that the
disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons affected,”93 then total exclusion of a single, narrow class from
military service raises the same inference. By excluding a class of
persons from all military service based on their purported negative
impact on “unit cohesion,” the military acts precisely in the manner
that Romer prohibits: identifying “persons by a single trait and
86. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632–33 (1996).
87. Id. at 632.
88. Id. at 629.
89. Id. (“Amendment 2, in addition, nullifies specific legal protections for this
targeted class in all transactions in housing, sale of real estate, insurance, health
and welfare services, private education, and employment.”).
90. Id. at 633.
91. Id. at 627.
92. Id. at 632.
93. Id. at 634.
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then den[ying] them protection across the board.”94 Unit cohesion
justifications are not founded on desires to disadvantage undesirable people in limited or specific ways. Instead, unit cohesion justifications disadvantage undesirable people in all aspects of military
service because they completely exclude the undesirable people
from military service. Thus, claims of unit cohesion have overly
broad effects on certain groups. This overbreadth results in laws of
“unusual character” which prohibit certain groups from receiving
protections simply because they exist. Simultaneously, the claim of
unit cohesion has a narrow effect on the nation’s population. These
claims affect only those in the excluded groups who wanted to serve
in the military. Further, not all of the members of the excluded
group would negatively affect the cohesion of the unit in every instance. Each military unit is composed of different people with
wide ranges of life experiences. But the military simply assumes
that the excluded group’s presence would disrupt cohesion across
the board. This disconnect between the overly broad discrimination and the narrow scope of the justifications lies at the heart of
many equal protection claims.
Romer’s direct applicability to future animus cases is difficult
to predict. Romer seemingly stands for the proposition that a radical lack of fit may be presumably based on animus, but it is unclear
just how radical that lack of fit must be to fail rational basis review.
Moreover, the Court faced peculiar circumstances in Romer—
namely, the Court attempted to strike down a law that discriminated against homosexual persons while circumnavigating the effect
of Bowers. Yet, these peculiar circumstances have now evaporated
since the Court overturned Bowers in Lawrence v. Texas.95 This
radical change in equal protection jurisprudence obscures Romer’s
applicability to future cases. Nevertheless, Romer’s concern with
narrowly targeted discrimination that has overly broad effects was
revived in the Court’s latest animus case: United States v.
Windsor.96

94. Id. at 633.
95. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“Bowers was not correct
when it was decided, and it is not correct today. It ought not to remain binding
precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled.”).
96. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
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D. Dignitary Injury as Impermissible Animus: United States v.
Windsor
1. Windsor’s Approach to Animus
In Windsor, the Supreme Court again struck down97 an overly
broad law that targeted gays and lesbians: the Defense of Marriage
Act (DOMA).98 DOMA had two key elements that conspired to
render the law constitutionally inadequate: (1) Section 3, which defined “marriage” in all federal laws as a union between one man
and one woman;99 and (2) Section 2, which prohibited federal
courts from compelling states to recognize same-sex marriages that
were valid in other states.100
DOMA shared similar traits with Colorado’s Amendment 2.
First, DOMA’s impact was unusually broad: DOMA applied to
over 1,000 federal laws that used the term “marriage.”101 DOMA
constituted a “systemwide enactment with no identified connection
to any particular area of federal law.”102 Thus, DOMA affected
virtually every part of life—such as estate taxes, Social Security
benefits, housing, criminal sanctions, copyright, veterans’ benefits,
health care, and bankruptcy—with no particularized rationale for
the effects in each instance. In the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy noted that DOMA’s broad effect belied any non-animusbased argument that DOMA’s purpose was administrative “efficiency.”103 Second, the Court found that DOMA’s discrimination
was of an “unusual character” in that it removed marriage—or at
least its boundaries—from its traditional place as a state concern.104
Because of the unusual character of the discrimination, the Court
applied closer judicial scrutiny to the law. Unlike in Romer, however, the Court decided Windsor after Lawrence overturned Bowers. Thus, in Windsor, the Court did not need to engage in
jurisprudential gymnastics to condemn animus against homosexual
persons.
To the Court, DOMA’s breadth and unusual character suggested animus. In reviewing the legislative history and text of
DOMA, Justice Kennedy noted that “interference with the equal
97. Id. at 774–75.
98. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104–199, § 3(a), 110 Stat. 2419
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012) and 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012)), invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013) [hereinafter DOMA].
99. Id. § 3(a); 1 U.S.C. § 7.
100. DOMA § 2(a); 28 U.S.C. § 1783C.
101. See Windsor, 570 U.S. at 752.
102. Id. at 772.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 770 (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996)).
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dignity of same-sex marriages” was not just an “incidental effect” of
DOMA, but rather its essence.105 Kennedy found the “purpose and
effect” of DOMA was “to disparage and to injure those whom the
State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and
dignity.” The Court thus found DOMA unconstitutional.106 In its
holding, the Court noted: “[T]he principal purpose and necessary
effect of this law are to demean those persons who are in a lawful
same-sex marriage. This requires the Court to hold, as it now does,
that DOMA is unconstitutional . . . .”107 Windsor thus stands for
the proposition that a government’s use of identity-based classifications to purposefully inflict dignitary injury is impermissible
animus.108
2. Windsor and the Unit Cohesion Justification
Windsor’s application to identity-based unit cohesion claims is
striking. Like DOMA, a complete ban on military service based on
one’s identity is an unusually broad strike against all persons with
that identity. Such a ban prevents the military from even evaluating
the abilities of persons with that identity. Unlike tailored, identitybased exclusions from specific tasks that are based on a person’s
inability to contribute, unit cohesion-based exclusions deprive potential service members of all aspects of service—much like how
DOMA eliminated same-sex marriage from all federal statutes.
That said, Windsor’s reliance on discrimination of an “unusual
character” could arguably limit its application to some unit cohesion-based exclusions. Given the U.S. military’s history of discriminating for the sake of unit cohesion, deeming the character of such
discrimination “unusual” may stretch Windsor’s reasoning. However, when compared to the many legitimate bases for excluding
people from military service listed in current accession and retention policies,109 the unusual character of unit cohesion-based exclusion becomes clear. The overwhelming majority of legitimate bases
for exclusion from military service—health conditions, age, and
105. Id.
106. Id. at 775.
107. Id. at 774.
108. Justice Scalia confirmed this reading, observing in his dissent that “the
real rationale of [the majority] opinion . . . is that DOMA is motivated by ‘bare . . .
desire to harm’ couples in same-sex marriages.” Id. at 744 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
109. The accessions and recruiting policies of the Department of Defense include hundreds of bases for excluding persons from military service, including
medical conditions, mental health diagnoses, and age. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 532
(2018); DEP’T OF DEF., MEDICAL STANDARDS FOR APPOINTMENT, ENLISTMENT,
OR INDUCTION INTO THE MILITARY SERVICES, DOD INSTRUCTION 6130.03 (May 6,
2018), http://bit.ly/2y5TGxU.
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mental disability—are tied to an individual’s ability to contribute to
the military mission. In this context, unit cohesion-based exclusions
stand out as unusual; such exclusions are not based on the individual’s ability to contribute. Instead, unit cohesion-based exclusions
are grounded in the individual’s identity and the anticipated disruption their identity might cause.
However, Windsor’s ultimate holding—that a law is unconstitutional when its principal purpose and necessary effect are to demean certain individuals—is a dagger in the heart of unit cohesionbased exclusions. Exclusion based on unit cohesion is demeaning
per se and a dignitary harm. What greater harm can there be to
one’s dignity—what can be more demeaning—than to be excluded
from a group not because of an inability to contribute, but because
members of the group do not like you? This dignitary effect is compounded when the government stamps its imprimatur on the social
disdain. The demeaning effect is only amplified by complete exclusion from the military, an institution whose members accumulate
significant reputational and pecuniary benefit from both the government and society at large.
E. Scholars’ Coherent Animus Doctrines and Unit Cohesion
Recently, scholars have attempted to articulate a coherent animus doctrine based on the various forms of animus that the Court
has recognized. Three such theories are presented below.110 As
unit cohesion implicates all forms of animus under the Court’s animus jurisprudence, it is not surprising that unit cohesion justifications also fall short of constitutional scrutiny under each of these
scholars’ articulations of a unified theory of animus.
1. Professor Pollvogt’s Unconstitutional Animus Doctrine
In her unified theory of the Court’s animus jurisprudence, Professor Susannah Pollvogt argues that animus is a type of “impermissible objective function.”111 Under this view, animus exists where
law creates and enforces distinctions between social groups—that
is, when groups of persons are identified by status rather than con110. These theories are presented with apologies to the scholars whose work
is oversimplified here.
111. Pollvogt, supra note 22, at 926. Although Pollvogt wrote pre-Windsor,
her theory survives it. The federal restriction on same-sex marriage in DOMA was
held to be unconstitutional in part because it disparaged, injured, and demeaned
people based on a single characteristic—the desire to marry someone of the same
sex—without regard for meritocratic principles and for the purpose of asserting
heterosexual marriage supremacy.
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duct.112 Pollvogt asserts several theoretical bases to support the unconstitutionality of animus. First, laws based on animus run
counter to the meritocratic principles of the U.S. Constitution and
American democracy.113 Second, laws that divide people into
groups express the ideology of social group supremacy, which the
Constitution forbids.114 Third, such laws, whether intended or not,
create castes and thus contravene a fundamental purpose of the
Equal Protection Clause: eliminating class-based legislation.115
Pollvogt’s understanding of animus clearly supports the idea
that identity-based unit cohesion claims are based in animus. When
the government excludes persons from military service based on
who they are, it ostensibly disrupts the social order of the military
unit and enforces distinctions between social groups through public
law.
Unit cohesion-based justifications further violate each of the
policy considerations underpinning Pollvogt’s unified theory. Excluding persons from military service because of who they are
rather than what they can do runs counter to the meritocratic principles of the Equal Protection Clause. Additionally, citing unit cohesion to exclude groups from the military suggests that some types
of people are “unacceptable.” This suggestion results in an ideology of social group supremacy—castes—of the type forbidden by
Brown v. Board of Education116 and Loving v. Virginia.117 Excluding a group of people from military service because they will not
“fit in” based on their identity brands members of that identity
group as “undesirable” or, at the very least, “lesser.”
2. Professor Carpenter’s “Windsor Products” Animus Doctrine
Writing with the benefit of the Court’s latest installment of animus jurisprudence in Windsor, Professor Dale Carpenter’s “antianimus principle”118 asserts that in a liberal democracy, the government has a moral and sometimes constitutional duty to not act mali112. Id.
113. Id. (citing Maxwell L. Stearns, Direct (Anti-)Democracy, 80 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 311, 369–83 (2012)).
114. Id.
115. Id. (citing William N. Eskridge, Jr., Is Political Powerlessness a Requirement for Heightened Equal Protection Scrutiny?, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 3 (2010)).
116. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
117. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
118. Carpenter uses the term “anti-animus principle” to describe the role that
animus plays in equal protection jurisprudence. See generally Carpenter, supra
note 22 (discussing the development of the “anti-animus principle” in equal protection jurisprudence).
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ciously toward a person or group of people.119 Under Carpenter’s
view, the “government acts on animus when, to a material degree, it
aims ‘to disparage and to injure’ a person or group of people.”120
The injury may be tangible or intangible, including an affront to the
dignity and respect that all people deserve as equal citizens, and
“may be caused by their exclusion from a status they would have
absent animus against them.”121 Under Carpenter’s approach, the
desire to reward and encourage socially beneficial behavior by one
group—with the resulting inequality toward the group(s) not exhibiting the socially beneficial behavior—is not in itself animus. But
the desire to harm one group is.122
Carpenter argues that Windsor was primarily based on animus.123 The label Carpenter assigns to his animus theory—“Windsor Products”—draws on the assertion that United States v.
Carolene Products Company124 would “correctly predict that the
targets of animus will almost always be politically unpopular minorities.” But unlike Carolene Products’ concern for classifications involving certain vulnerable classes, the “Windsor Products”
approach protects all citizens from animus-based government
action.125
Acknowledging the possibility that government acts may involve both benign and malign animus-based purposes, Carpenter
suggests that a court need not accept either the government’s benign characterization of its purpose or the challenger’s malign characterization.126 Instead, Carpenter argues, a court should
determine if animus materially influenced the government action,
and if it did, the court should invalidate the law.127 Drawing from
Windsor and other animus cases, Carpenter offers several factors
for courts to consider when determining whether animus materially
influenced a particular government action,128 including: (1) the
119. Id. at 185.
120. Id. at 186 (quoting United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 775 (2013)).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 186.
123. Id. at 187–88 (arguing the Windsor Court struck down DOMA because it
thought that the act was motivated by animus).
124. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
125. Carpenter, supra note 22, at 215; see also Daniel Farber & Suzanna
Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 257, 258 (1996) (“[The pariah
principle] forbids the government from designating any societal group as untouchable, regardless of whether the group in question is generally entitled to some special degree of judicial protection, like blacks, or to no special protection, like lefthanders (or, under current doctrine, homosexuals).”).
126. Carpenter, supra note 22, at 245.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 245–46.
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statutory text (textual);129 (2) the political and legal context of the
statute’s passage, including a historical background demonstrating
past discriminatory acts and a departure from the usual substantive
considerations governing the decision—especially if the considerations upon which the decision-maker relied strongly favor a decision contrary to the one reached (contextual);130 (3) the legislative
proceedings, including any evidence of animus that can be gleaned
from the sequence of events that led to passage, the legislative procedure, and the legislative history accompanying passage (procedural);131 (4) the law’s harsh real-world impact or effects, including
the injury to the tangible or dignitary interests of the disadvantaged
group (effectual);132 and (5) the utter failure of alternative explanations to offer legitimate ends and means that actually advance those
ends (pretextual).133
Applying Carpenter’s animus doctrine to claims of unit cohesion demonstrates how barring a group from attaining a status that
it might have otherwise have enjoyed—that of military member and
veteran—constitutes cognizable animus-based injury. The central
questions are whether the government’s actions demonstrate intent
to disparage or injure the excluded group and whether that intent is
material to the government action. Determining whether a unit cohesion justification constitutes government intent to harm the excluded group requires examining the government decision’s text,
the political and legal context, the procedure surrounding the adoption of the decision, the actual effects of the government action on
the disadvantaged group, and the value of alternative explanations.
Carpenter’s approach is thus highly fact-specific and difficult to apply to unit cohesion in the abstract.
129. Id. at 245 n.226 (first citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996);
and then citing United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 770 (2013)).
130. Id. at 246 n.227 (first citing U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S 528,
537–38 (1973); then citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S.
432, 448 (1985); then citing Romer, 517 U.S. at 623–24; then citing United States v.
Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 770–71 (2013); and then citing Vill. of Arlington Heights v.
Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 257–59 (1977)).
131. Id. at 246 n.228 (first citing Moreno, 413 U.S. at 536–57; then citing
Windsor, 570 U.S. at 771–74; then citing Bassett v. Snyder, 951 F. Supp. 2d 939, 968
(E.D. Mich. 2013); and then citing Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 268).
132. Id. at 246 n.229 (first citing Romer, 517 U.S. at 627–28; then citing Windsor, 570 U.S. at 770–75; and then citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242
(1976)). Carpenter notes that the Supreme Court “has not explained why a law’s
harmful impact is a sign that animus motivated its passage.” Id.
133. Id. at 246 n.230 (first citing Moreno, 413 U.S. at 537; then citing
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 449–50; then citing Romer, 517 U.S. at 635; and then citing
Windsor, 570 U.S. at 770–73). Carpenter also notes that “[c]oncern about using
pretext to justify an unconstitutional act is as old as McCulloch v. Maryland.” Id.
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3. Professor Araiza’s Burden-Shifting, Intent-Based Animus
Doctrine134
Professor Araiza distills a slightly different theory of the
Court’s animus cases. Araiza posits that the cases parallel the
Court’s discriminatory intent equal protection jurisprudence.135
Like Pollvogt and Carpenter, Araiza concludes that animus is unconstitutional per se.136 Araiza argues that the Court’s animus
cases reflect attempts to answer one question: “[I]s the law really
aimed at burdening a group for its own sake, out of simple disapproval of that group as human beings?”137 When it is, the law is
unconstitutional.
Araiza’s explanation of the Court’s various approaches to animus focuses on determining whether sufficient animus exists to invalidate the government action.138 Extending Carpenter’s purpose
inquiry, Araiza argues that the Court’s approach to finding animus
parallels the burden-shifting inquiry found in discriminatory intent
equal protection jurisprudence.139 Under that approach, once a
plaintiff shows that intent to discriminate was a motivating factor,
the burden shifts to the government to show that it would have
made the same decision absent discriminatory intent.140 Applying
this approach to the animus inquiry, Araiza suggests that once a
plaintiff shows animus, the burden shifts to the government to show
that the law or action was not based on animus and that the government would have taken the action absent the alleged animus. In
other words, the government must show that “legitimate needs motivated the government’s action.”141
If a law that disadvantages a class based on societal disapproval
of that group as human beings constitutes animus, then identitybased unit cohesion justifications should fail. Categorical exclusion
from military service clearly disadvantages the excluded group.142
134. WILLIAM D. ARAIZA, ANIMUS: A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO BIAS IN THE
LAW 120–33 (2017) [hereinafter ARAIZA, INTRODUCTION TO BIAS IN THE LAW].
135. Id. at 122.
136. See id. at 89–90, 112, 139 (referring to animus consistently as “unconstitutional animus”).
137. Id. at 142–43.
138. See id. at 134–43.
139. See id. at 120–33.
140. See id. at 121–24 (citing Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)).
141. Id. at 124.
142. Excluded persons are denied all the significant opportunities and benefits military service may offer. For example, military service offers tangible benefits, such as technical skills training, education benefits, leadership training, tax
advantages not available to other government employees, and paths to citizenship

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\123-1\DIK102.txt

2018]

unknown

FIRE, AIM, READY!

Seq: 27

19-OCT-18

13:56

83

Therefore, only one question remains: is the exclusion based on
disapproval of the group? The idea that one’s presence disrupts the
military unit simply based on his or her identity is plainly disapproval of people with that identity characteristic. By extension, implementing the exclusion policy is government enforcement of that
disapproval. Under Araiza’s burden-shifting approach, when the
government asserts that an identity-based exclusion from military
service is necessary to protect unit cohesion, the government itself
satisfies the plaintiff’s initial burden of showing animus. Consequently, the burden falls upon the government to demonstrate that
legitimate needs motivated the government action. This stage is
where a fact-specific inquiry into a particular exclusion from military service, of which unit cohesion was but one claimed justification, would determine the exclusion’s constitutionality.
II. EFFECT

OF

FINDING ANIMUS

As with other classifications, the government rarely offers only
one justification for its discrimination,143 and the unit cohesion justification is no different. Accordingly, the distinctions among the
various jurisprudential approaches regarding the effect of a finding
of animus are crucial to understanding the significance of accepting
that the unit cohesion justification constitutes animus. Specifically,
if animus is detected in one justification, does that defeat all of the
not available to other immigrants. Historically, military service and citizenship
have been linked. Through the nation’s three largest wars, desertion resulted in
loss of citizenship and citizenship could be earned through military service. Military service also offers intangible benefits, such as the prestige associated with being a patriot. The association between military service and full status as an
American was regrettably demonstrated by the higher rate at which black veterans
were targeted for abuse and lynching following World War I. Even after military
service, lifelong government benefits accrue to veterans in the form of pensions,
disability benefits, medical care, educational benefits, hiring preferences, special
recognition through license plates, and other government-sanctioned special statuses. Society, too, accords tangible benefits to veterans in a variety of forms, including military and veteran hiring preferences in private industry and substantial
consumer discounts.
143. For example, throughout the Moreno litigation, the government offered
multiple justifications for excluding Food Stamp benefits from households where
unrelated adults lived: alleviating hunger, combatting the increased potential of
abuse of the Food Stamp program, the relative instability of households where
unrelated persons live together, and the immorality of such living arrangements.
U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 535–37 (1973); ARAIZA, INTRODUCTION TO BIAS IN THE LAW, supra note 134, at 29–36. Similarly, in Cleburne, the
government offered numerous reasons to deny the CLC a permit to operate a
group home for intellectually disabled persons, including traffic, proximity to a
junior high school, the potential for harassment, overcrowding, and safe evacuation of residents from a floodplain. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc.,
473 U.S. 432, 449–50 (1985).
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government’s justifications? The Court’s answer to that question
has been unclear, and the animus scholars have provided a variety
of answers.
A. Animus Precedent and the Effect of Finding Animus
Moreno, the progenitor of modern animus jurisprudence, is the
Supreme Court’s most circumspect approach regarding the effect of
a finding of animus. After asserting that a bare congressional desire
to harm cannot constitute a legitimate government interest, the
Court noted: “[A] purpose to discriminate against hippies cannot,
in and of itself and without reference to some independent considerations in the public interest, justify the [discriminatory law].”144
In other words, the presence of animus as one motivation did not
automatically defeat the law; ostensibly, the presence of some independent considerations could have saved it. However, when the
Court analyzed the government’s other purported rationale—that
the amendment to the food stamp program was based on preventing people from defrauding the government—it found that the classification was “without any rational basis.”145 Although the Court
did not explicitly state that the presence of animus created skepticism towards the other rationale, it examined the other rationale
more critically than expected under the traditional rational basis review.146 Thus, the finding of animus appears to have discredited the
government’s other proffered explanations.
In Cleburne, as in Moreno, the finding of animus did not immediately end the Court’s inquiry into whether the classification withstood constitutional scrutiny. After disapproving of the City
Council’s decision to respond to citizens’ dislike of the cognitively
disabled, the Court somewhat skeptically considered other justifications for the City Council’s action. The Court’s approach in
Cleburne echoed Moreno. In her later concurring opinion in Law144. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534–35 (brackets omitted) (quoting Moreno v. U.S.
Dep’t of Agric., 345 F. Supp. 310, 314 n.11 (D.D.C. 1972)).
145. The Court found the Amendment did not combat fraud:
Thus, in practical operation, the 1971 amendment excludes from participation in the food stamp program, not those persons who are “likely to
abuse the program” but, rather, only those persons who are so desperately in need of aid that they cannot even afford to alter their living arrangements so as to retain their eligibility.
Id. at 538.
146. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488–89
(1955) (“[T]he law need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to
be constitutional. It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that
it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to
correct it.”).
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rence, Justice O’Connor drew on the reasoning of Moreno and
Cleburne to assert that a finding of animus should prompt a court to
apply a “more searching form of rational basis review” to the other
asserted justifications.147 Justice O’Connor’s proposed form of review is not at all the same as deciding that a finding of animus automatically renders the challenged classification unconstitutional.148
In Palmore, the unanimous Court invalidated the judge’s action not because the government interest was not compelling or the
method of accomplishing that interest was insufficiently tailored,
but because laws that enforce private bias are invalid, regardless of
whether there is an acceptable government interest.149 Palmore
thus stands for the proposition that when government action gives
effect to private prejudice, it is invalid even if the government action would have otherwise satisfied the traditional tiers-of-scrutiny
analysis. Notably, the Court has not followed Palmore’s apparent
“poisoned well” approach—where the existence of animus defeats
alternative justifications, no matter how sufficient—in all of its subsequent animus opinions.150 However, the Court’s apparent aversion to Palmore’s approach might be due to the unique nature of
the situation in Palmore—namely, that the only justification that
the government offered constituted animus on its face.151
In Romer, the finding of animus invalidated the challenged
152
law.
However, the effect of a finding of animus in Romer is
somewhat circular. The Court detected animus because it concluded no other justification could explain the incredible breadth of
the discrimination.153 The cause and effect of the animus finding
were thus the same: animus existed because no other justifications
made sense, and no other justifications could save the law from the
finding of animus. Notably, under the Court’s approach in Romer,
as in Moreno and Cleburne, the Court still considered the govern147. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
148. Id.
149. Indeed, the Court acknowledged that protecting the interests of minor
children is a “duty of the highest order.” Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433
(1984).
150. For example, in Romer and Cleburne the Court detected animus and
then considered the merits of the government’s asserted justifications for the classification. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996); City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 447–50 (1985).
151. See Palmore, 466 U.S. at 434.
152. Romer, 517 U.S. at 635–36 (affirming the state court’s order enjoining
enforcement of the amendment).
153. Id. at 632 (“[Amendment 2’s] sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the
reasons offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects.”).
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ment’s other justifications after detecting animus and before determining the law was unconstitutional.154 Once again, animus alone
was insufficient to invalidate the law; however, animus plus the failure of the other government justifications proved fatal.
In Windsor, the Court took a rather direct route to finding animus. After identifying DOMA’s unusual breadth,155 its disrespect
for the traditional notions of federalism,156 the legislative history,157
and even the title of the statute itself,158 the Court announced the
law was based on animus and thus unconstitutional.159 In fact, the
Court skipped the rational basis review process of considering the
government’s justifications altogether. The only mention the Court
made to rational basis review occurred in the penultimate sentence
declaring the statute invalid because “no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those
whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity.”160 By stating “no legitimate purpose overcomes,” rather than “no legitimate purpose can overcome,” the
Court suggested that impermissible animus can be overcome.161
On the other hand, the Court also failed to address meaningfully
the government’s justifications for DOMA. This failure to address
the government’s justifications suggests either that animus cannot
be overcome or that in some instances evidence of intent to disparage and injure is so clear that evaluating the government’s purported justifications is unnecessary. Moreover, if animus can be
overcome by legitimate purposes, the Court failed to explain how.
Unit cohesion is rarely offered as the only justification for discriminatory treatment by the military.162 For example, unit cohe154. Id. at 635.
155. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 765–66, 772–74 (2013).
156. Id. at 766–69.
157. Id. at 770–71.
158. Id. at 771.
159. Id. at 770, 775.
160. Id. at 775 (emphasis added).
161. Id. At a minimum, with his choice of language, Justice Kennedy avoided
the opportunity to settle the question of the effect of finding animus.
162. The transgender ban was premised on other justifications. See supra
notes 5, 11–20 and accompanying text. Don’t Ask Don’t Tell’s precursor ban on
homosexual servicemembers was similarly premised not only on unit cohesion, but
also on “undue influence in various contexts caused by an emotional relationship
between two members; doubts concerning a homosexual officer’s ability to command the respect and trust of the personnel he or she commands; and possible
adverse impact on recruiting.” Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 811 (9th Cir.
1980).
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sion is one of several justifications that President Trump and the
lawyers defending the military’s transgender ban offered.163
Under the Court’s “more searching rational basis review,” government assertions that it is excluding persons from military service
because their identities affect unit cohesion should lead a court to
find animus. Once such a finding is made, a court should then conduct a more skeptical review of the government’s other purported
bases for exclusion. Alternatively, under the Palmore poisonedwell approach, the unit cohesion justification poisons the government’s other purported justifications, even those not based on
animus.164
Windsor’s lack of clarity regarding whether animus can be
overcome produces two interpretations. Under the first interpretation, if government animus—under Windsor, an “intent to disparage and harm”—cannot be overcome by other legitimate
justifications, the government’s identity-based unit cohesion justification should have the same effect as the finding of animus in Palmore. Namely, the court should find that the animus underlying
one justification causes all other justifications to fail. However,
under the second interpretation of Windsor, if government animus
can be overcome, then examination of the unit cohesion justification should follow the Moreno-Cleburne-Romer approach. Namely,
the court should skeptically consider the government’s other purported justifications.
B. Scholars’ Theories Regarding the Effect of Finding Animus
The animus scholars have also articulated various understandings of the effect of finding animus, ranging from a bright-line rule
to a more complicated approach. Pollvogt advocates for a “silver
bullet” understanding of a finding of animus.165 Under Pollvogt’s
approach, evidence of animus “discredits the other purported state
interests, regardless of whether they are legitimate on a superficial
163. For example, in addition to a concern over unit cohesion—articulated as
“disruption”—President Trump’s initial Tweets offered the additional justifications
of a “need to focus on overwhelming and decisive victory” and “avoid[ing] exorbitant medical costs.” July 26, 2017 Twitter Announcement, supra note 5. In early
litigation defending the transgender ban, the government argued that transgender
individuals could suffer from medical conditions that impede performance of duties; some medical conditions could limit the deployability of transgender individuals and impose financial costs on the armed forces. See, e.g., Doe v. Trump, 275 F.
Supp. 3d 167, 185–86 (D.D.C. 2017).
164. See supra notes 39–40, 149–51 and accompanying text.
165. Pollvogt, supra note 22, at 930.
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level.”166 In essence, no justification for a classification can withstand a court’s finding that animus was present in the creation of
the classification. Pollvogt argues that this is “appropriate, because
if animus is, indeed, constitutionally impermissible, no law found to
be based in animus should be permitted to stand.”167
If one accepts the argument that identity-based unit cohesion
justifications are always based in animus, Pollvogt’s “silver bullet”
understanding of the effect of a finding of animus would always defeat other purported bases for exclusion from military service. That
is, if the government offers identity-based unit cohesion as a justification, the government would fatally poison its attempt to exclude.
Pollvogt’s understanding of the effect of a finding of animus might
help clarify how unit cohesion is an unconstitutional pretext for disparaging a group. Thus, perhaps Pollvogt’s understanding could educate government actors on the malevolence inherent in unit
cohesion arguments. On the other hand, one disadvantage of
Pollvogt’s approach is that the government might never again assert
identity-based unit cohesion as a justification, making animus more
difficult to detect. Indeed, Pollvogt’s silver bullet approach may
have this negative effect on all future government classifications; if
the presence of animus categorically invalidates classifications, government actors may take extraordinary measures to hide it.
Carpenter’s understanding of the effect of finding animus
slightly modifies Pollvogt’s understanding. To Carpenter, the animus must be a “material influence” on the government action to
render the action unconstitutional.168 Under Carpenter’s view, a
finding that only some legislators or government actors harbored or
acted upon animus would not necessarily invalidate a law. At the
same time, an animus-based purpose would not need to be the sole
or even dominant purpose to invalidate the law.169 According to
Carpenter, when animus’s material influence is deduced, the presence of animus has a “tainting effect” and the act is unconstitutional even if the government offers legitimate reasons to justify
it.170
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Carpenter, supra note 22, at 245.
169. Id. at 231, 245. “It is likely that any legislative body, and certainly an
electorate [of significant size], would act with a multitude of purposes in mind.”
Id. at 231.
170. Id. at 186, 248. Here, the label on Carpenter’s animus approach—”as
‘Windsor Products’ ”—is further elucidated. In Carolene Products, the presumption of constitutionality did not apply when the political process could not be
trusted to treat unpopular minorities fairly. Id. at 248. Under the Windsor Prod-
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Carpenter’s slightly more nuanced approach means that when
unit cohesion is one of several purported justifications, a materiality
examination is required.171 If one accepts that unit cohesion is animus per se, the remaining question is whether the purported unit
cohesion justification was material to the government’s exclusionary classification. Arguably, a government assertion of unit cohesion as a basis for the exclusionary classification is itself a material
government admission. In other words, if the government admits
that a particular consideration provided a reason for the classification, that consideration is per se material. Thus, the likely result of
a unit cohesion justification under Carpenter’s approach would mirror the result under Pollvogt’s approach: invalidation of the exclusionary classification. Such a result would likely put an end to the
government’s use of identity-based unit cohesion justifications. In
light of the historical abuses that the government has carried out in
the name of “unit cohesion,”172 perhaps this result would be
welcome.
Araiza’s theory of the process by which courts should find animus informs his understanding of the effect of a finding of animus.
Araiza argues that the animus inquiry parallels, albeit imperfectly,
the burden-shifting approach of discriminatory intent jurisprudence.173 Under discriminatory intent jurisprudence, a plaintiff
must first show that discriminatory intent was a motivating factor in
the classification, and then the burden shifts to the government to
prove that it would have made the same decision despite the discriminatory intent.174 Araiza suggests the animus inquiry is similar:
Once a plaintiff demonstrates that animus was a factor in the challenged government action, the burden shifts to the government to
prove it would have made the same decision despite the impermissible animus.175
Under Araiza’s theory, the challenger must first show animus
was a factor in the government action.176 This holistic factual inquiry can be cabined by borrowing from considerations under the
traditional discriminatory intent inquiry, including:
ucts approach, the presumption of constitutionality also no longer operates after
the court is alerted to possible animus.
171. Id. at 243.
172. See, e.g., supra notes 1–5, 9–10 and accompanying text.
173. ARAIZA, INTRODUCTION TO BIAS IN THE LAW, supra note 134, at 89–104.
174. See, e.g., Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 270 n.20 (1977).
175. ARAIZA, INTRODUCTION TO BIAS IN THE LAW, supra note 134, at 124–25.
176. Id.
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[T]he extent and foreseeability of the disparate impact the decision created, the historical background of the decision, the more
recent and specific sequence of events leading up to the decision,
officials’ statements and other legislative history, and the extent
to which the challenged decision was marked by procedural or
substantive deviations from normal practice.177

Under Araiza’s approach, if a court determines that animus is
the sole reason for the classification, the case should end.178 But as
will be the case with most animus challenges, if the plaintiff can
only demonstrate that animus “may be lurking,” the court should
turn to the government for an explanation. A court must carefully
examine all of the government’s justifications; but rather than engaging a separate inquiry, Araiza’s conception suggests that this examination should be woven into the application of the relevant
level of scrutiny.179 Thus, a finding that animus “may be lurking”
shifts the burden to the government to prove that the policy meets
the appropriate level of scrutiny based on the classification involved. This shift has little effect on the examination of classifications that implicate heightened scrutiny because the government
already holds the burden of proving proper ends and means. A
finding of animus does have significant impact, however, in cases
requiring rational basis review. Typically, when a court applies rational basis review, the government has no burden to prove proper
ends and means. In fact, courts may speculate and create rational
bases for government action.180 However, where a court detects
animus, the government must prove its purported justification by
producing real evidence supporting the rationale.181
While requiring the government to offer “real” justifications
seems unremarkable in the context of some levels of heightened
scrutiny, it is unusual in the context of traditional rational basis re177. Id. at 134–35.
178. Id. at 42 (explaining that this is what occurred in Palmore—animus in the
form of private prejudice was the express, and only, justification for the discrimination); see also Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984).
179. ARAIZA, INTRODUCTION TO BIAS IN THE LAW, supra note 134, at 124–25.
180. See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993) (“[A]
legislative choice is not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on
rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.”); United States
R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 188 (1980) (clarifying that under rational basis
review a law must be upheld if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts
that could provide a rational basis for the classification). By contrast, in cases of
heightened scrutiny, the government bears the burden of proof. See, e.g., United
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (“The burden of justification is demanding and it rests entirely on the [government].”).
181. ARAIZA, INTRODUCTION TO BIAS IN THE LAW, supra note 134, at 140.
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view.182 But requiring the government to provide real justifications
allows the court to determine what really underlies a particular discriminatory action. Under Araiza’s approach, an initial detection
of animus prompts an intent-based inquiry that requires the government to prove that the animus did not “poison the well.” A finding
of animus can result in invalidation of the government action only
after applying this more careful scrutiny. Araiza’s approach keeps
the focus on the “constitutional wrong” of animus but incorporates
a traditional and well-exercised method of investigating improper
government motivation. Thus, the animus inquiry begins on the
premise that the government’s motivations are unknown. The animus inquiry itself is not as concerned with the level of scrutiny or fit
between the classification and the government interest as it is with
determining whether the government’s purported justification is the
real one. In fact, the Court demanded to know the government’s
true purpose in Moreno, Cleburne, and Windsor.
Of the animus scholars’ various understandings of the effect of
a finding of animus, Araiza’s approach requires the most extensive
analysis into the context of unit cohesion justifications. If a plaintiff
can show that the purported unit cohesion justification is animus,183
the government would then have the opportunity to demonstrate
that it would have excluded the group from military service absent
the animus-based unit cohesion justification. This shifting of the
burden will require the government to demonstrate a purpose for
the exclusion that is sufficient to meet the appropriate level of scrutiny.184 But the government must also demonstrate that the exclusion was appropriately tailored to that purpose. This step is where
categorical exclusions based on identity—exclusions that are statusbased rather than merit-based—will likely fail. The government’s
typical non-identity based justifications for military service exclusion185 are usually specific and relate to one’s ability to contribute
or the cost of service. The discontinuity between these specific justifications and the broad nature of identity-based categorical exclusions will frequently prove that the non-animus based justifications
182. Id. at 124–25 (explaining that the government is not ordinarily required
to furnish justifications at all); see also Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. at 315
(“[A] legislative choice is not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based
on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.”).
183. A plaintiff should be able to demonstrate this easily when the unit cohesion-based exclusion focuses on identity.
184. For example, a compelling justification for race-based exclusions, important or substantial justifications for sex-based exclusion, and legitimate justification
for classifications meriting only rational basis review.
185. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
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are not the real motivation. Thus, the government will be unable to
prove that it would not have adopted the classification absent the
animus, and the classification will fail.
III. THE TRANSGENDER BAN(S)
The latest identity-based unit cohesion justification centers on
the Trump Administration’s decision to exclude transgender persons from military service.186 On July 26, 2017, the President issued
a statement via Twitter announcing:
After consultation with my Generals and military experts, please
be advised that the United States government will not accept or
allow . . . Transgender individuals to serve in any capacity in the
U.S. military. Our military must be focused on decisive and overwhelming . . . victory and cannot be burdened with the tremendous medical costs and disruption that transgender in the military
would entail.187

These tweets were followed by a Presidential Memorandum to
the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security (“Presidential
Memorandum I”) about one month later.188 The “tweet order” and
Presidential Memorandum I contravened an earlier Department of
Defense announcement189 that allowed openly transgender individuals to enlist in the military and prohibited the discharge of service
members based solely on their gender identities. Presidential Memorandum I indefinitely extended the prohibition on transgender individuals entering the military,190 a process formally referred to as
“accession” (“Accession Directive”). Additionally, Presidential
Memorandum I required the military to authorize the discharge of
transgender service members (“Retention Directive”) by no later
than March 23, 2018.191
186. As will be explained further, unit cohesion was not the only justification
offered for the transgender ban, but it is the justification this Article addresses.
See infra notes 205–21 and accompanying text.
187. July 26, 2017 Twitter Announcement, supra note 5.
188. Presidential Memorandum for the Secretaries of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland Security: Military Service by Transgender Individuals, 2017
DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 587 (Aug. 25, 2017) [hereinafter Presidential Memorandum I].
189. See DEP’T OF DEF., IN-SERVICE TRANSITION FOR SERVICE MEMBERS
IDENTIFYING AS TRANSGENDER, DOD INSTRUCTION 1300.28 (June 30, 2016), http:/
/bit.ly/2xhj7wX; Directive-type Memorandum (DTM) 16-005, Military Service of
Transgender Service Members (June 30, 2016), http://bit.ly/2NJtEKZ.
190. Presidential Memorandum I, supra note 188.
191. Id.
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In Presidential Memorandum I, the President noted that the
military had prohibited accession or service of openly transgender
individuals until June 2016.192 He claimed:
[T]he previous Administration failed to identify a sufficient basis
to conclude that terminating the Departments’ longstanding policy and practice would not hinder military effectiveness and lethality, disrupt unit cohesion, or tax military resources, and there
remain meaningful concerns that further study is needed to ensure that continued implementation of last year’s policy change
would not have those negative effects.193

Presidential Memorandum I directed the Secretaries to return
to the pre-June 2016 policy until “a sufficient basis exists upon
which to conclude that terminating that policy and practice would
not have the negative effects discussed above.”194 Further, the
memorandum directed the Secretaries to “maintain the currently
effective policy regarding accession of transgender individuals into
military service beyond January 1, 2018, until such time as the Secretary of Defense, after consulting with the Secretary of Homeland
Security, provides a recommendation to the contrary that [the President finds] convincing.”195
The Secretaries were given until February 21, 2018, to submit a
plan to revert to the pre-June 2016 policy, which Presidential Memorandum I described as a policy that “generally prohibited openly
transgender individuals” from serving in the military.196
On February 22, 2018, the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum to the President relaying his findings and decision regarding military service by transgender persons (“SecDef Memo”)197
and attached a report on military service by transgender persons
(“DoD Report”).198 The SecDef Memo defines “transgender” as
“those persons whose gender identity differs from their biological
sex.”199 The Secretary of Defense further recommended the disqualification from military service of transgender persons who “re192. Id.
193. Id. (emphasis added).
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Memorandum from Sec’y of Def. James M. Mattis to President Donald J.
Trump (Feb. 22, 2018) [hereinafter SecDef Memo], http://bit.ly/2LcOJNr.
198. Id.; DEPARTMENT OF DEF., DEFENSE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
ON MILITARY SERVICE BY TRANSGENDER PERSONS (Feb. 2018) [hereinafter DOD
REPORT], http://bit.ly/2LcOJNr.
199. SecDef Memo, supra note 197.
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quire or have undergone gender transition.”200 He also
recommended the disqualification from military service of transgender persons with “a history or diagnosis of gender dysphoria.”201
The SecDef Memo asserts: “A subset of transgender persons diagnosed with gender dysphoria experience discomfort with their biological sex, resulting in significant distress or difficulty functioning.
Persons diagnosed with gender dysphoria often seek to transition
their gender through prescribed medical treatments intended to relieve the distress and impaired functioning associated with their diagnosis.”202 The SecDef Memo suggests allowing persons with a
history or diagnosis of gender dysphoria to serve, but only under
the following limited circumstances:
(1) if they have been stable for 36 consecutive months in their
biological sex prior to accession; (2) Service members diagnosed
with gender dysphoria after entering into service may be retained
if they do not require a change of gender and remain deployable
within applicable retention standards; and (3) currently serving
Service members who have been diagnosed with gender
dysphoria since the previous administration’s policy took effect
and prior to the effective date of this new policy, may continue to
serve in their preferred gender and receive medically necessary
treatment for gender dysphoria.203

The SecDef Memo prohibits transgender people—including
those who have neither transitioned nor been diagnosed with gender dysphoria—from serving, unless they are “willing and able to
adhere to all standards associated with their biological sex.”204 Importantly, the SecDef Memo also notes that exempting transgender
persons from the mental health, physical health, and sex-based
standards that apply to all service members, including transgender
service members without gender dysphoria, “could undermine
readiness, disrupt unit cohesion, and impose an unreasonable burden on the military that is not conducive to military effectiveness
and lethality.”205
The ban implemented in March 2018206 effectively excludes
nearly all transgender persons from the military and defends that
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.; see also Karnoski v. Trump, No. C17-1297-MJP, 2018 WL 1784464, at
*6 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 13, 2018).
205. SecDef Memo, supra note 197 (emphasis added).
206. Presidential Memorandum I, supra note 188.
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exclusion with clearly articulated, specific bases. The DoD Report
suggests several issues could cause unit cohesion problems, including: unit readiness, perceptions of fairness and equity, personnel
safety, and reasonable expectations of privacy at the unit and subunit levels.207 The readiness concern relates to deployability, which
is itself a separate justification that the Trump Administration offered for excluding transgender persons.208 To the extent that unit
cohesion concerns based on readiness are ability-based rather than
identity-based, readiness may be a legitimate basis for classification.
But given that many transgender persons are deployable—in fact,
there is no evidence suggesting that transgender service members
are any more non-deployable than non-transgender service members—and many non-transgender service members are non-deployable, the complete exclusion of transgender persons belies the
assertion that the exclusion is based on ability rather than identity.209 Moreover, the “perceptions of fairness and equity”210 concern returns to the familiar ground of identity-based prejudice, as
does the “reasonable expectations of privacy”211 concern. As a
valid concern,212 personnel safety is a basis not for complete exclusion of transgender persons, but rather for more requirements to
ensure safety. Notably, the fact that the military does not seem
concerned with significant physical differences within the same
sex—for example, the military can force both a large man and small
man to engage in violent training activities against each other—suggests this “safety” concern is a mere subterfuge. Responding to
these concerns by implementing a complete exclusion, rather than
tailored rules, suggests what underlies the exclusion is animus.
Some of the Department of Defense’s justifications are identity-based and therefore demonstrate animus. But there is a constitutionally significant difference between identity-based exclusions
and ability-based exclusions. Namely, the latter might not be based
on dislike and may be therefore constitutional. Ability-based exclusions should be carried out in the same way that all performance207. DOD REPORT, supra note 198.
208. Id.
209. Alex Ward, Trump Wants to Kick Trans Troops Out. “Deployability”
Might Keep Them In, VOX (Aug. 31, 2017), http://bit.ly/2pbXppD (noting that in
July 2016, approximately 148,000 soldiers were “non-deployable,” while only 29 to
129 active service members were non-deployable due to seeking gender transitionrelated medical care in a given year).
210. DOD REPORT, supra note 198.
211. Id.
212. The arguments usually suggest that allowing biological males to engage
in violent activities with biological females due to the gender identity of one could
result in physical mismatches that could lead to injury. See id.
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based unit cohesion exclusions are carried out: by enforcing the
capability requirements rather than imposing a complete ban on all
people with a particular characteristic that might affect ability.213
The government initially offered empty explanations for the
transgender ban’s relationship to unit cohesion. In early litigation,
the government attempted to defeat the challenge to the unit cohesion justification by asserting that “the President could reasonably
conclude that the accessions policy furthers ‘unit cohesion.’ ”214 Notably, the government explained neither how the transgender ban
was necessary for unit cohesion, nor why the President concluded
that allowing transgender persons in the military would disrupt unit
cohesion. Instead, the government merely asserted that the President’s view could have reasonably differed from that of the military’s 2016 conclusion that the presence of transgender persons
would not affect unit cohesion.215 Thus, when given the opportunity, the government initially offered no non-identity-based justification for the President’s conclusion that the presence of
transgender troops would adversely affect unit cohesion.216 It took
the government more than six months to offer specific arguments
regarding how the presence of transgender troops might affect unit
cohesion.217 This delay strongly suggests that the unit cohesion justification was based on identity rather than ability.
After receiving the Secretary of Defense’s recommendation,
the President issued a new memorandum (“Presidential Memorandum II”), in which he authorized the Secretaries of Defense and
Homeland Security to “implement any appropriate policies concerning military service by transgender individuals” and revoked

213. For example, the “inability to adapt to the military environment” during
training, which can be based on the inability to complete training requirements,
can serve as a basis for discharge, as can repeated fitness test failures. See, e.g.,
Army Regulation 635-200, Active Duty Enlisted Administrative Separations,
Chapter 11; Air Force Instruction 36-3208, Administrative Separation of Airmen, ¶
5.65.
214. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Application
for a Preliminary Injunction at 33, Doe v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 167 (D.D.C.
2017) (No. 17-1597).
215. Id.
216. In attacking the RAND Report’s conclusions on unit cohesion, the government did suggest that it should have considered whether deployability would
affect unit cohesion, but this was a hypothetical assertion rather than an explanation for President Trump’s conclusion that unit cohesion would be affected. See id.
217. These examples first appeared in the DoD Report. See DOD REPORT,
supra note 198, at 35–40.
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Presidential Memorandum I.218 Thus, Presidential Memorandum II
effectively approved the Secretary of Defense’s implementation
plan.
The government has argued that the March 2018 revision is a
“new policy.”219 Opponents of the ban, and at least one federal
district court, have rejected this argument.220 The idea that the
DoD Report and SecDef Memo constituted an entirely new policy
is laughable, especially in light of the fact that both were prepared
at the direction of the President when he initially announced the
ban.221 On the other hand, it is also inaccurate to say the revised
ban and the original ban are the same, as the revised version allows
some transgender people to serve, whereas the original ban allowed
none. Further, the revised ban includes much more detailed explanations of the government’s interests and justifications for the
exclusion.
A. The Various Forms of Animus and the Transgender Ban
Because the Supreme Court has identified a variety of forms of
animus without articulating a coherent animus doctrine, the transgender ban should be evaluated under each approach.
1. Palmore, Cleburne, and the Transgender Ban
The animus articulated in Palmore and Cleburne—that the
government cannot adopt or give effect to private bias or
prejudice—invalidates any identity-based unit cohesion justification
for the transgender ban. The notion that the presence of transgender persons in the military disrupts unit cohesion is, in essence,
the notion that unit-member reactions to the presence of transgender persons will disrupt the unit’s ability to accomplish its mis218. Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland Security Regarding Military Service by Transgender Individuals, 83 Fed. Reg.
13, 367 (Mar. 23, 2018) [hereinafter Presidential Memorandum II].
219. See SecDef Memo, supra note 197, at 2.
220. The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington
concluded the March 2018 revision was the same ban threatening the same constitutional violations. Karnoski v. Trump, No. C17-1297-MJP, 2018 WL 1784464, at
*5–6 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 13, 2018) (“[T]he 2018 Memorandum and the Implementation Plan do not substantively rescind or revoke the Ban, but instead threaten the
very same violations that caused it and other courts to enjoin the Ban in the first
place.”).
221. Presidential Memorandum I, supra note 188, at § 3 (“By February 21,
2018, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland
Security, shall submit to me a plan for implementing both the general policy set
forth in section 1(b) of this memorandum and the specific directives set forth in
section 2 of this memorandum.”).
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sion. District courts have observed that the military has recently
produced evidence that contradicts this notion.222 While correct,
that observation is unnecessary.223 Based on the understanding of
animus expressed in Palmore and Cleburne, service members’ personal prejudices and the potential for disruption are impermissible
grounds for exclusionary classifications. As Cleburne instructs, the
government may not avoid the Equal Protection Clause by deferring to the prejudices of some members of the community.224 The
government may neither exclude transgender persons simply because it does not like them for who they are, nor base its exclusion
on the assertion that some service members may dislike them or
find the accommodations they receive “unfair.”
The revised transgender ban offers some non-identity-based
rationale for the proposition that the presence of transgender personnel might adversely affect unit cohesion.225 Nevertheless, identity-based justifications that implicate private prejudices remain.
For example, the proposition that some military members might
find it “unfair” or “inequitable” to hold transgender personnel to
the standards and requirements set for their gender identity rather
than their biological sex is based on requirements that those members deem appropriate for a certain “type” of person.226 That is
private prejudice.
Concern that one’s unit is not ready to accomplish its mission
because personnel might be medically disqualified from deployment for a period of time may give rise to legitimate, non-prejudicebased concerns of potential lack of unit cohesion. However, the
possibility that some unit member will be non-deployable is always
a concern. Dental problems, training injuries, pregnancy,227 and
other medical conditions can occur in any military unit. But the
fact that a member of the unit might break an ankle during a training exercise is never cited for having a negative impact on unit co222. See, e.g., Doe v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 167, 213 (D.D.C. 2017); see also
Karnoski, 2018 WL 1784464, at *2–4.
223. See supra notes 206–21 and accompanying text.
224. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985).
225. See supra notes 206–21 and accompanying text.
226. See DOD REPORT, supra note 198, at 31 (“By allowing a biological male
to adhere to female uniform and grooming standards it creates unfairness for other
males who would also like to be exempted from male uniform and grooming standards as a means of expressing their own sense of identity.”); see also id. at 36
(“[P]olicy that permits a change of gender without requiring any biological changes
risks creating unfairness, or perceptions thereof, that could adversely affect unit
cohesion and good order and discipline.”).
227. The possibility of pregnancy was once voiced as a basis for categorical
exclusion of women from military service.
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hesion. Importantly, the revised transgender ban does not tailor
exclusion to the non-deployability concern in any meaningful way:
It still excludes transgender persons who are well past medical procedures that could temporarily render them non-deployable. In
light of this reality, asserting that the non-deployability of transgender persons—but not those who have teeth, ankles, or a
womb—could adversely affect unit cohesion suggests that the nondeployability rationale is offered as a pretext for prejudice.
2. Moreno and the Transgender Ban
Applying the animus articulated in Moreno to the transgender
ban demonstrates the difficulty of proving an affirmative desire to
harm. As of this writing, the government actor primarily responsible for the ban—President Trump—has neither stated a desire to
harm transgender persons nor referred to transgender persons pejoratively as the legislators in Moreno referred to “hippies.” Nevertheless, indirect evidence of a desire to harm may still exist.
District courts have observed that the unit cohesion claim expressed by President Trump contradicts military evidence that demonstrates the presence of transgender individuals in fact does not
disrupt unit cohesion.228 However, that observation is unnecessary
under Palmore and Cleburne because identity-based unit cohesion
claims are inherently claims based on private prejudice. However,
under Moreno animus—where a plaintiff must show that a desire to
harm the group exists—the inconsistency between President
Trump’s policy announcement and the military’s findings is relevant
because it evinces—albeit indirectly—a desire to harm the group.
Specifically, a 2016 study commissioned by the military concluded
that allowing transgender persons to serve would not create unit
cohesion problems,229 while President Trump asserted that it would.
This inconsistency alone at least suggests that President Trump’s exclusionary policy is based on a desire to harm transgender people.
Other actions taken by the Trump administration also suggest a
possible desire to harm transgender persons. For instance, Vice
President Mike Pence participated in efforts to reverse the Obama
administration’s “trans-friendly” military policies.230 In 2017, the
228. See, e.g., Doe v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 167, 213 (D.D.C. 2017); see also
Karnoski v. Trump, No. C17-1297-MJP, 2018 WL 1784464, at *2–4 (W.D. Wash.
Apr. 13, 2018).
229. See AGNES GEREBEN SCHAEFER ET AL., ASSESSING THE IMPLICATIONS
OF ALLOWING TRANSGENDER PERSONNEL TO SERVE OPENLY (2016), http://bit.ly/
2NLwdMq.
230. Paul McLeary, Pence Working to Reverse Pentagon’s Transgender Policies, FOREIGN POLICY (July 25, 2017), http://bit.ly/2xf0sBY (reporting Vice Presi-
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Trump Administration rescinded both transgender protections for
students in federally funded schools and a Department of Justice
memo that protected transgender workers.231 These actions suggest
that the transgender ban was less concerned with military effectiveness and more concerned with harming a politically unpopular
group.
Although the Moreno Court did not explore why the legislators sought to harm “hippies,” it did not foreclose such exploration.
In Moreno, direct evidence of the legislators’ desire to harm a particular group existed. When such evidence is absent, an investigation into what might motivate a particular government actor to
attempt harming a particular group might prove that the government actor is in fact doing so.232 Various motivations to harm may
exist, and not all rely on personal bigotry. President Trump may
believe that he will gain political advantage by instituting the ban.
In fact, significant evidence demonstrates that President Trump announced the transgender ban to appease conservative members of
Congress.233 Moreover, the assertion that President Trump is a politician “playing to his voter base” through anti-transgender policies
seems plausible.234 In Moreno, the Court found that the legislators’
dent Pence had been reaching to House Republicans to push for legislation barring
use of appropriated funds to provide medical treatment related to gender
transition).
231. See German Lopez, Trump’s Ban on Transgender Troops, Explained,
VOX (Dec. 11, 2017), http://bit.ly/2NQcbjO; see also The Discrimination Administration: Trump’s Record of Action Against Transgender People, NAT’L CTR. FOR
TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, http://bit.ly/2MCd239 (last visited July 17, 2018).
232. This is similar to criminal law, where demonstrating motive can help
prove the defendant committed a crime. See, e.g., State v. Hampton, 855 P.2d 621,
625 (Or. 1993) (clarifying how motive makes the fact that the defendant committed
the crime more probable than if such a motive were not established).
233. See, e.g., Rachel Bade & Josh Dawsey, Inside Trump’s Snap Decision to
Ban Transgender Troops, POLITICO (July 26, 2017), https://politi.co/2Ots2Sq
(“White House officials . . . noted that conservatives had pushed for the ban, including in a May letter that was signed by dozens of right-leaning groups.”). Interestingly, some accounts of the story suggest the most immediate trigger for
President Trump’s decision was a request from House Republicans like Rep. Vicky
Hartzler, a Republican representative from Montana, who requested that the defense budget not include money for gender reassignment surgery. Trump’s response to ban all service by transgender individuals in response to that more
limited request, while welcomed by some, could also suggest animus. Another theory suggests that President Trump’s ban was in exchange for funding for his border
wall proposal. Id.; see also Michael A. Cohen, Trump’s Transgender Ban Is Based
on Hate, BOST. GLOBE (Aug. 24, 2017), http://bit.ly/2NM9sbm (“[T]he real reason
Trump initially announced it is that he thought it would help him get congressional
Republican support for a bill appropriating money for his border wall.”).
234. See, e.g., Joe Garofoli, Transgender Ban Is All About Trump Shoring Up
His Base, S.F. CHRON. (July 26, 2017), http://bit.ly/2NhP2aH (suggesting Trump
deliberately reignited a culture war for political gain). Thus, although President

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\123-1\DIK102.txt

2018]

unknown

FIRE, AIM, READY!

Seq: 45

19-OCT-18

13:56

101

desires to harm hippies, regardless of their personal feelings toward
hippies, rendered the statute unconstitutional.235 Similarly, political
motivations for harming transgender service members and recruits
should invalidate the transgender ban, even if the President’s personal feelings toward transgender persons are not apparent.
In contrast to the initially tweeted policy, the revised ban contains no expressions of dislike on behalf of the policymakers. To
the contrary, the DoD Report goes out of its way to avoid connotations of disrespect or disapproval by explicitly referring to transgender persons as “valued members of our Nation.”236 Indeed, had
the DoD Report and the revised ban initiated without the President’s initial animus-based conclusion, Moreno animus would likely
not be implicated at all.
3. Romer and the Transgender Ban
The Romer Court’s concern with discrimination that is “at once
too narrow and too broad”237 was explicitly implicated by President
Trump’s tweet announcing the transgender ban, which stated:
“[T]he United States government will not accept or allow transgender individuals to serve in any capacity in the U.S. military.”238
In so tweeting, the President identified “persons by a single trait
and then denied them [the ability to serve in the military] across the
board.”239 Admittedly, the injury in Romer may have been more
severe than the injury here. Amendment 2 precluded homosexual
persons from securing protection from discriminatory mistreatment, whereas the transgender ban simply precludes military service. But so long as one accepts that exclusion from military service
is an injury, the distinction is immaterial to the more important
point—the ban uses the single, narrow trait of being transgender to
deny participation in the military across the board. This demonstrates animus.
Trump’s motivation may not be personal bigotry, it may rely on the bigotry or
prejudice of some of his political supporters.
235. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534–36 (1973).
236. See, e.g., DOD REPORT, supra note 198, at 6 (“[N]othing in this policy
should be viewed as reflecting poorly on transgender persons who suffer from gender dysphoria, or have had a history of gender dysphoria, and are accordingly disqualified from service.”); see also id. (“Transgender persons with gender dysphoria
are no less valued members of our Nation than all other categories of persons who
are disqualified from military service.”).
237. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996).
238. July 26, 2017 Twitter Announcement, supra note 5.
239. An important difference between the transgender ban and the law in
Romer is highlighted by my replacing “protections” with the phrase “military
service.”
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In essence, President Trump’s tweet said: If you are transgender, we don’t want you in the military under any circumstances.
That statement is the sort of caste- or class-based legislation that
the animus doctrine prohibits. Unit cohesion asserts that a service
member’s status as transgender is itself “disruptive,” without accounting for potentially legitimate considerations—such as medical
readiness to deploy or high health care costs—associated with one’s
transgender status. In Romer, the Court used the animus doctrine
to ascertain what was “really going on” with the classification. The
President’s use of unit cohesion to justify a total bar on service
based on a single identity characteristic demonstrates what is really
going on: animus.
Turning to Romer’s application to the transgender ban, the Department of Defense’s attempt to revise the policy must be addressed because although the policy prevents service by most
transgender persons, it no longer serves as a blanket ban on all
transgender persons. Specifically, the revised ban relates to medical conditions and individual behaviors more than the original
tweet policy did.240 The revised ban even includes an exception
that allows military members caught between the two presidential
administrations’ policies to continue serving in their preferred genders.241 Thus, the revised policy can no longer be fairly characterized as identifying persons by a single trait and then denying them
military service across the board.
The Trump Administration’s decision to allow a few alreadyserving transgender members to continue serving in their preferred
genders may be a nod to justice for those caught between the two
administrations’ policies. However, that decision also critically undercuts the Trump Administration’s position that the mere presence
of transgender troops so adversely affects unit cohesion that near
total exclusion is appropriate.242 If some transgender troops can
serve without adversely affecting unit cohesion, the across-theboard ban on all other transgender persons suggests that animus,
not actual concern for unit cohesion, continues to motivate the actions of the Trump Administration.
240. Compare Presidential Memorandum I, supra note 188, with July 26, 2017
Twitter Announcement, supra note 5.
241. Presidential Memorandum I, supra note 188; see also DOD REPORT,
supra note 198, at 43.
242. The DoD Report anticipates this argument about the untenability of its
position by attempting to claim the limited exception is severable from other portions of the policy if courts attempt to use the exception “as a basis for invalidating
the entire policy.” DOD REPORT, supra note 198, at 43.
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4. Windsor and the Transgender Ban
Windsor animus is also present in the transgender ban, because
the ban is unusually broad, of an unusual character, and causes dignitary harm. The unit cohesion justification for the transgender ban
broadly discriminates against all transgender persons, regardless of
the excluded person’s status, expression of gender identity, or ability to contribute to the military. Like the persons harmed in Windsor and Romer, the disadvantaged transgender recruits and service
members are identified by a single trait and then harmed “across
the board” because of it.
This exclusion from military service also constitutes discrimination of an “unusual character,” especially given how the policy was
initially announced. As one of the district courts addressing the ban
noted:
The discrimination in this case was certainly of an unusual character. As explained above, after a lengthy review process by senior military personnel, the military had recently determined that
permitting transgender individuals to serve would not have adverse effects on the military and had announced that such individuals were free to serve openly. Many transgender service
members identified themselves to their commanding officers in
reliance on that pronouncement. Then, the President abruptly
announced, via Twitter—without any of the formality or deliberative processes that generally accompany the development and
announcement of major policy changes that will gravely affect
the lives of many Americans—that all transgender individuals
would be precluded from participating in the military in any capacity. These circumstances provide additional support for Plaintiffs’ claim that the decision to exclude transgender individuals
was not driven by genuine concerns regarding military
efficacy.243

The court further noted that the ban contradicted the military’s
own recent study that concluded unit cohesion would not be a
problem.244
The transgender ban’s “ready, fire, aim” sequencing further
demonstrates the ban’s unusual character: President Trump banned
transgender personnel from service without any apparent policy de-

243. Doe v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 167, 213 (D.D.C. 2017).
244. Id. (“[T]he military concerns purportedly underlying the President’s decision had been studied and rejected by the military itself.”).
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liberation. Though the Constitution245 does not require presidents
to first consider all of the potential ramifications before making policy decisions, President Trump’s conclusion included animus. Animus cannot be quelled by subsequent policy considerations when
an initial animus-based conclusion gives rise to the subsequent policy discussions.
As in Windsor, where the unusual breadth and character of the
discrimination demonstrated intent to cause dignitary injury,246 the
unusual breadth and nature of the transgender ban demonstrates
that the unit cohesion justification is actually just intentional harm.
5. Scholarly Unifying Theories and the Transgender Ban(s)
Pollvogt’s approach to animus—where law is used to create
and enforce distinctions between people based on status rather than
conduct247—dooms all identity-based unit cohesion justifications,
and the transgender ban is no exception. Unit cohesion claims exclude transgender persons from military service based on their
identities. Thus, the ban enforces social distinctions between
groups based on identity rather than ability or conduct. It is again
worth noting here that the revised ban also contains ability-based
justifications.248 But the continued presence of identity-based justifications, such as the assertion that some military members will perceive unfairness if transgender persons compete or dress according
to their gender identities rather than their biological sexes,249 poisons the classification. The animus that motivated the ban “discredits the other purported state interests, regardless of whether they
are legitimate.”250
The transgender ban also fails under Carpenter’s theory of animus. Under Carpenter’s approach, if the desire “to disparage and
to injure” is a “material influence” on the government’s classifica245. This Article does not address whether it is consistent with statutory administrative law requirements for policy consideration to precede policy
conclusions.
246. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S 744, 768–69 (2013).
247. See Pollvogt, supra note 22, at 942.
248. See, e.g., Presidential Memorandum II, supra note 218; DOD REPORT,
supra note 198, at 20–21 (“[Gender dysphoria] is associated with clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational or other important areas of
functioning.”); DOD REPORT, supra note 198, at 23 (discussing members recovering from gender reassignment surgery being unable to deploy).
249. See, e.g., DOD REPORT, supra note 198, at 31 (“By allowing a biological
male to adhere to female uniform and grooming standards, it creates unfairness for
other males who would also like to be exempted from male uniform and grooming
standards as a means of expressing their own sense of identity.”).
250. Pollvogt, supra note 22, at 930.
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tion decision, the classification is unconstitutional.251 Carpenter
suggests that determining whether this improper motivation is present requires examining several factors.252
First, the text of the classification must include the President’s
initial tweets, which contained neither pejorative references to
transgender persons that might indicate a desire to harm nor a satisfying explanation for unit cohesion that might demonstrate there
was no desire to harm.
Second, the “political and legal context” of the ban’s implementation suggests a desire to harm.253 The Trump Administration’s other discriminatory acts demonstrate, at a minimum, a
desire to roll back protections for transgender persons. Moreover,
the “fire, aim, ready” approach of first announcing a policy decision
that contradicted readily available evidence and then later commissioning a study is a clear departure from “the usual substantive considerations governing the decision.”254
Third, Carpenter suggests examining the legislative proceedings, including any evidence of animus that can be gleaned from the
events that led to the classification.255 The President’s transgender
ban announcement followed calls by numerous conservative groups
for such a ban.256 The ban may have been a response to a congresswoman’s proposal for a similar, albeit less extensive, discriminatory
policy257 or a bargaining chip for other policy negotiations.258 Either way, the suspicious procedure through which the Administration passed the ban could show animus motivated the decision. In
conjunction with the fact that President Trump’s decision preceded
the military’s examination of the issue—indeed, it preceded any
Department of Defense request to change the policy—the legislative record demonstrates animus.
Fourth, the effects of the transgender ban are significant. The
ban excludes an entire group of persons from the military, a profession that many in society consider noble and worthy. In modern
America, societal and governmental benefits are heaped upon mili251. Carpenter, supra note 22, at 185–86.
252. Id. at 245–46.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 246.
255. Id.
256. See Lopez, supra note 231. Notably, there is no evidence that the ban
was requested by the Department of Defense.
257. See Bade & Dawsey, supra note 233 (describing how Representative
Vicky Hartzler originally proposed a ban on funding for gender reassignment surgeries and treatments for transgender active-duty personnel only).
258. See id. (reporting that the transgender ban was an effort to obtain border
wall funding).
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tary members and veterans.259 Additionally, telling a group of people that they are not worthy of defending the nation because of who
they are causes significant dignitary harm.
Carpenter’s fifth and final consideration—the failure of alternative explanations to offer legitimate ends and means that really
advance those ends—cuts in both directions when it comes to the
transgender ban. The DoD Report,260 and even President Trump’s
initial tweets,261 articulated legitimate ends in addition to unit cohesion. Reducing medical expenditures and ensuring service members are medically able to deploy and fight are legitimate ends. But
again, the disparity between those legitimate ends and the means of
total exclusion raises the question of whether the ban was motivated by animus. If the Department of Defense had issued the
DoD Report before the policy announcement and if the exclusion
had been tailored to the legitimate ends, a bar on some transgender
persons from service may have been justified, just as exclusion of
others with particular medical or mental health issues has been justified in the past. However, the Administration would have needed
to base such justifications on the legitimate end sought, and not on
a person’s transgender status.
Under Araiza’s approach, it is important to determine whether
the Administration’s actions constitute one ban or two before turning to the government’s opportunity to prove that it would have
made the decision to exclude transgender persons from military service absent the animus-based unit cohesion justification. If the
combined announcements and policy changes comprise a singular
ban, then the government’s inability to prove that a sufficient justification or legitimate motive existed at the time of President
Trump’s original tweets condemns the policy. On the other hand, if
the Department of Defense’s version of the policy constitutes a second, separate ban, the government may be able to prove that it had
legitimate justifications for the revised policy. In other words, the
government may be able to demonstrate that it would have implemented the latter ban absent animus against transgender persons.
The most relevant consideration to the animus analysis is the
motive behind the classification.262 Animus is less apparent in the
259. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
260. DOD REPORT, supra note 198.
261. July 26, 2017 Twitter Announcement, supra note 5.
262. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (finding
bare desire to harm unacceptable basis for classification); see also Karnoski v.
Trump, No. C17-1297-MJP, 2018 WL 1784464, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 13, 2018)
(finding that the revised transgender band was the “same” ban).

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\123-1\DIK102.txt

2018]

unknown

FIRE, AIM, READY!

Seq: 51

19-OCT-18

13:56

107

more nuanced unit cohesion justification set forth in the DoD Report, but it is not entirely absent.263 Moreover, even if the DoD
Report had removed animus from the unit cohesion justification—
for example, if none of the justifications for unit cohesion were
based on identity—the animus that motivated the initial articulation of the ban was still the proximate cause of the DoD Report
and revised policy.264 Stated simply, the revised ban and its neartotal exclusion of transgender persons exists as a result of the animus that motivated the first version of the ban which 44 categorically excluded all transgender persons.
The revised transgender ban raises the question of what effect
the initial unit cohesion justification should have on the second installment of accession and retention policies, which no longer asserted unit cohesion.265 Accepting that the initial unit cohesion
justification was animus, subsequent justifications should be assessed similar to the way in which a court would have assessed alternative justifications in the first instance: with a skeptical
approach to the alternative justifications. In the transgender ban
case, the unit cohesion claim set forth in the initial policy announcement should have invalidated the other justifications; the claim of
unit cohesion raises suspicion that what truly underlies the policy is
263. The DoD Report articulated the unit cohesion argument in a way that at
least partially did not rely on animus. Rather, the DoD Report suggested the perceived unfairness of allowing biological males to compete in physical requirements
with biological females was unfair. Similarly, the DoD Report cited concerns
about privacy expectations in communal showering situations, where biological females might be uncomfortable with the presence of biological males in the same
open shower or locker room. Thus, the DoD Report attempted to show how the
presence of transgender persons could affect unit cohesion by referring to biological realities rather than relying on members’ dislike of, or discomfort with, transgender persons. Nevertheless, even as it attempted to divorce transgender identity
from the unit cohesion justification, animus against transgender persons remains,
as the unit cohesion arguments are based on assumptions of how persons of a
certain biological sex should perform or behave. See DOD REPORT, supra note
198.
264. The DoD Report was prepared at the direction of the President as part
of his articulation of the transgender ban in Presidential Memorandum I. Ostensibly, but for the initial articulation of the ban and its underlying animus, the DoD
Report would not have been created. In fact, it appears as though Secretary of
Defense Mattis was hoping to avoid the issue of transgender service altogether.
See, e.g., Bade & Dawsey, supra note 233.
265. Carpenter explicitly considered the possibility that a government actor
might “try again” after initially using impermissible animus. He noted that in
many cases there would not be an alternative legitimate explanation for the challenged action and that reasons that led a court to conclude the initial action was
based on animus will make subsequent courts skeptical of claims of a change of
heart. Carpenter, supra note 22, at 235.
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a desire to harm a disliked group.266 If the effect of animus is taken
seriously, the government’s mere removal of identity-based unit cohesion from subsequent policy iterations cannot on its own save the
classification. A court should examine the revised justifications
with the same skepticism that it would have applied had those justifications been present in the initial iteration of the ban. A court
could even use Araiza’s approach and require the government to
show, using real evidence, that animus does not underlie the policy.
When a policy classifies individuals based on a certain trait, the
court should ask: “[I]s the law really aimed at burdening a group
for its own sake, out of simple disapproval of that group as human
beings?”267 This inquiry should be context-specific and should not
ignore the government’s previous actions on the matter.
In the second iteration of the transgender ban, not only did the
government replace much of the identity-based unit cohesion justification, but it also tailored the other justifications more narrowly.
The other justifications included specific medical-based exclusions
that mirror the hundreds of other medical exclusions that apply to
everyone.268 The first iteration of the ban excluded all transgender
persons from military service. Because the revised version excludes
transgender persons on a somewhat less categorical basis and for
somewhat different reasons, the government could plausibly argue
that the classification itself is no longer the same, thus there should
be no reason to evaluate the government’s justifications skeptically.
However, the case law currently comprising the animus doctrine
suggests that this argument should be insufficient to overcome the
stain of impermissible animus.
B. Where’s the Animus? Initial Transgender Ban Litigation
Given the significance of a finding of animus, one might expect
the lower federal courts to address animus in all equal protection
challenges. Yet the early district court opinions in the string of
transgender ban cases typify the federal courts’ apprehensiveness
toward animus jurisprudence.269 Of the three district courts that
have issued substantive opinions on the transgender ban, only one
266. See supra notes 237–42 and accompanying text.
267. ARAIZA, INTRODUCTION TO BIAS IN THE LAW, supra note 134, at 142–43.
268. DOD REPORT, supra note 198, at 2–3.
269. This apprehensiveness is not related solely to the transgender ban cases.
District courts have long been wary of relying on animus, even in same-sex marriage cases after Windsor. See, e.g., Carpenter, supra note 22, at 184 n.3.
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addressed animus.270 However, even that court’s treatment of animus is somewhat marginal.
1. Doe v. Trump
Of the current challenges to the transgender ban, Doe v.
Trump271 is the only case in which the court discussed animus.
There, the court noted that the plaintiffs acknowledged that unit
cohesion is an “important or at least legitimate government” interest but concluded that the government had offered no evidence
showing transgender persons harm unit cohesion.272
Notably, the court in Doe did not acknowledge animus as an
independent constitutional violation of the “silver bullet” variety.273
The Doe court’s only reference to animus arose in its application of
traditional intermediate scrutiny.274 In a footnote citing Palmore,
the court stated:
To the extent this [harm to unit cohesion] is a thinly-veiled reference to an assumption that other service members are biased
against transgender people, this would not be a legitimate rationale for the challenged policy. “Private biases may be outside the
reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give
them effect.275

This limited reference unduly obscures the importance of animus because it rejects one purported government interest—unit cohesion—in isolation on the basis of animus. Palmore did more than
that. The court should have cited Palmore for the idea that even if
the appropriate level of scrutiny is otherwise satisfied, animus, in
the form of government action giving effect to private bias, poisons
that conclusion.276 In other words, a finding of animus should invalidate the otherwise acceptable government interests, just as it
did in Palmore.
270. See Doe v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 167, 213 (D.D.C. 2017).
271. Doe v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 167 (D.D.C. 2017).
272. Id. at 211.
273. Id. at 213. The court found that “even if none of the reasons discussed
above alone would be sufficient for the Court to conclude that Plaintiffs were
likely to succeed on their Fifth Amendment claim, taken together they are highly
suggestive of a constitutional violation.” Id.
274. The court did consider “discriminations of an unusual character,” though
not as part of a comprehensive review of animus. See id.
275. Id. at 212 n.10 (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984)).
276. Recall that in Palmore, the Court invalidated the trial court’s decision
because it constituted giving effect to private bias, even where strict scrutiny was
otherwise overcome. Palmore, 466 U.S. at 433–34.
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Under Araiza’s approach, once the court concludes that some
animus exists, it should apply the appropriate level of scrutiny to
determine whether the animus is fatal. The Doe court had this
backward: it stated that animus is not a legitimate interest.277
While true, the court should have moved beyond that conclusion to
assess the other purported government interests to determine
whether those interests actually motivated the government’s action.
In its ruling on the plaintiff’s request for preliminary injunction, the Doe court cited other cases in the animus canon,278 but not
for their comprehensive contributions to the animus analysis. For
example, the court cited Moreno and Windsor for the proposition
that “a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot
justify disparate treatment of that group,” but it did not engage a
full analysis to determine whether such a bare desire to harm existed in the transgender ban’s development.279 Further, the court
cited Cleburne only for the proposition that a classification must be
rationally related to a legitimate state interest.280 Finally, the court
cited Romer only for the concept that an equal protection violation
occurs when the government withdraws rights from a disfavored
group.281
2. Karnoski v. Trump
In Karnoski v. Trump,282 the district court did not mention animus in either of its substantive opinions on the plaintiffs’ equal protection claims. In reviewing the plaintiffs’ request for preliminary
injunction, the court failed to cite Moreno, Cleburne, Palmore, or
Romer, despite having conducted an equal protection analysis.283
As in Doe, the Karnoski court applied the traditional tiers-of-scrutiny analysis and addressed whether the transgender ban burdens a
suspect class. In its first substantive opinion, the Karnoski court
applied intermediate scrutiny,284 but by its second opinion—on
summary judgment—the court found it more appropriate to apply
277. See Doe, 275 F. Supp. 3d at 208–10.
278. See id. at 212–13.
279. Id. at 211. To be fair to the court, the procedural posture of the opinion
may have limited the court’s ability and willingness to make factual determinations
necessary for a full animus analysis.
280. See id. at 209.
281. See id. at 215.
282. Karnoski v. Trump, No. C17-1297-MJP, 2018 WL 6311305 (W.D. Wash.
Dec. 11, 2017).
283. Id. The court did cite Windsor to establish the right to equal protection.
Id. at *7.
284. Id. at *9.
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strict scrutiny.285 In the second opinion, the Karnoski court finally
mentioned Cleburne and Windsor, but not for their contributions to
animus.286 The court’s failure to address animus in either opinion is
even more striking given the Ninth Circuit’s treatment of animus in
Perry v. Hollingsworth.287 There, the Ninth Circuit struck down
California’s Proposition 8, which prohibited same-sex marriage, on
the basis that Proposition 8 was founded upon animus.288
3. Stone v. Trump
As in Karnoski, the district court in Stone v. Trump289 also
failed to mention animus in its initial substantive opinion. Moreover, the court failed to cite Cleburne, Palmore, or Romer at all. Although the court cited Moreno for the proposition that a “lack of
any justification for the abrupt policy change, combined with the
discriminatory impact to a group of our military service members
. . . , cannot possibly constitute a legitimate governmental interest,”290 the court failed to engage in any further discussion of animus. The court also cited Windsor only for the proposition that the
Fifth Amendment does not permit the government to demean its
citizens.291 Ultimately, the district court applied intermediate scrutiny to determine whether the plaintiffs’ equal protection claims
were likely to succeed.292 In so doing, the court ignored the last
three decades in which the Supreme Court has applied animus in
lieu of identifying new suspect classifications.293
CONCLUSION
The opinions in Doe, Karnoski, and Stone were all issued at
preliminary stages of litigation; thus, each case will likely see fur285. Id. at *10–13.
286. Cleburne and Windsor were cited to establish the appropriate level of
scrutiny. Id. at *10.
287. As Pollvogt has noted, in Perry v. Brown, the Ninth Circuit addressed
the question of “whether the Equal Protection Clause permitted [enactment of a
law] the sole purpose of which was to deprive a designated group of rights that
they previously possessed.” Pollvogt, supra note 22, at 932 (citing Perry v. Brown,
671 F.3d 1052, 1064 (9th Cir. 2012)). Perry was vacated and remanded on other
grounds. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693 (2013).
288. Perry, 671 F.3d at 1064, vacated and remanded sub nom. Hollingsworth v.
Perry, 570 U.S. 693 (2013).
289. Stone v. Trump, 280 F. Supp. 3d 747 (D. Md. 2017).
290. Id. at 768–69.
291. Id. at 770.
292. Id. at 768.
293. The court did cite gender as one of its bases for applying intermediate
scrutiny, which does not require identification of a new suspect or quasi-suspect
class.
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ther developments in the facts and legal analyses. The district
courts’ general avoidance of animus does not appear to be based on
hostility toward the plaintiffs’ equal protection arguments. Indeed,
the judicial opinions issued on the transgender ban have all agreed
that the ban violates the Equal Protection Clause. But the courts’
general failures to address animus are missed opportunities to address a policy that potentially discriminates against a group based
on a bare desire to harm. The lower courts’ collective failure to
address animus also demonstrates the problems that arise from the
Supreme Court’s failure to clearly articulate animus’s role in equal
protection jurisprudence. Future judicial opinions regarding the
transgender ban should, at minimum, address whether the exclusion
of a group of people based, at least initially, upon their identity
implicates the various forms of animus.
The context of the initial transgender ban, justified in part by
identity-based “unit cohesion,” demonstrates that the ban was premised upon unconstitutional animus. The revised ban, while less
overt, still includes features of animus in its unit cohesion justification and thus cannot escape its genesis. The decision to allow transgender members who have never experienced gender dysphoria to
“serve . . . in their biological sex”294 is at least partially based on
concerns that some service members will feel uncomfortable
around a person who presents in a way that does not conform to his
or her biological sex. Whether based on perceived unfairness or
discomfort, the unit cohesion justification is identity-based animus:
the dislike of certain people because of who they are. Members of
society are free to hold prejudices. Members of the military are
free to hold private prejudices. The government is not.

294. DOD REPORT, supra note 198, at 32.

